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Executive Summary
Following the European Council’s target to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions 80 to 95% below 1990 lev-
els by 2050, the European Commission recently re-
leased a roadmap that already indicates what could 
be the relative contributions of the different sectors, 
which is setting the scene for new EU level policy ac-
tions. In the policy area of transport there is already 
a follow up roadmap with envisaged priority actions, 
and also in the area of energy such a policy roadmap 
will be released this year, 2011. This report gives rec-
ommendations for this 2050 energy roadmap.
Chapter 1 introduces different studies in which stake-
holders have presented visions of the low-carbon en-
ergy system they desire for 2050. We analyze the vi-
sions of the European electricity industry association, 
representatives of the European gas industry, the Eu-
ropean Climate Foundation, the intergovernmental 
International Energy Agency and a non-governmen-
tal environmental organization in cooperation with 
an association of the renewable energy industry. The 
key policy challenges concerning the six main ener-
gy-related policy areas to achieve these visions are the 
following: 1/ energy efficiency - to achieve ambitious 
energy savings; 2/ greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions - 
to go towards a nearly zero-carbon electricity sector; 
3/ renewable energy - to achieve an ambitious renew-
able energy technologies penetration level; 4/ energy 
infrastructure - to ensure electricity grid adequacy 
through the expansion and smartening of the grid; 5/ 
internal energy market - to ensure electricity supply 
security through timely investments and system flex-
ibility; and 6/ technology innovation and R&D - to 
guarantee sufficient technology development for the 
achievement of the previous challenges. 
Chapter 2 is dedicated to the analysis of pioneering 
member states that have already started to address the 
key 2050 policy challenges identified in the previous 
chapter. We analyze Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Ireland and UK. Even though the status of the 
political process in these countries differs, the strate-
gies that are emerging illustrate how the key 2050 pol-
icy challenges can be addressed. The analysis raises 
some concern on potential risk of policy fragmenta-
tion, but also finds opportunities for cooperation and 
EU added value. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the possible role for the EU in 
addressing the key 2050 policy challenges. We use 
an analytical framework with three types of EU in-
volvement to derive promising EU interventions to 
deal with the challenges, which are summarized in 
Table 1. The first type of EU involvement corresponds 
to setting binding targets for member state actions. 
The second type of involvement is about harmoniz-
ing the actions taken by member states to achieve a 
certain target. The third type of EU involvement is to 
establish an EU-wide instrument in order to create a 
“level playing field”. At the end of the chapter, we also 
discuss the need for an integrated policy package to 
assure a least cost implementation path. Such a pack-
age would need to take into account different energy 
policy interactions without forgetting the role of gas, 
but also the interactions of energy policy with other 
EU policy domains including external trade, regional 
policies and external relations, employment and so-
cial affairs, economic and monetary affairs, research 
and innovation as well as wealth distribution and 
public support.
The main recommendations are that it will be crucial 
to track progress during the transition to allow for 
policy adaptation, which implies close monitoring of 
investments and policy implementation, and the EU 
can also add value to member states’ first steps on the 
road towards 2050. The ten priority EU interventions 
are: 1/ Make energy saving targets binding; 2/ Mobi-
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lize cities towards a low-carbon future; 3/ Strengthen 
the carbon price signal; 4/ Integrate renewable en-
ergy technologies into the market; 5/ Create a level 
playing field for renewable energy cooperation with 
non-EU countries; 6/ Harmonize the regulation of 
distribution and transmission grids; 7/ Design an EU 
infrastructure cost recovery instrument; 8/ Create an 
internal balancing market; 9/ Harmonize security of 
electricity supply mechanisms; 10/ Complement the 
Strategic Technology Plan (SET-Plan).
Table 1 – Promising EU interventions in the 2050 context
FIRST type of EU involvement SECOND type of EU involvement THIRD type of EU involvement
Effort sharing with binding 
targets:
Harmonization with coherence 
requirements:
Level playing field with EU-
level instruments:
Energy efficiency – Energy savings for 2020 and 
beyond
– Overall and sector specific energy 
savings
– Measuring and reporting to facilitate 
spreading of good practices
– Good practice forum or register
– Benchmarking of cities
GHG emissions – Reduction of GHG emissions 
beyond 2020 
– More stringent and credible long 
term caps
– Carbon pricing with renewable 
energy targets
– Carbon market repository, plat-
form, and authority for EU-ETS
– Carbon tax, at least for non-EU-
ETS sectors
Renewable energy – Renewable energy beyond 2020 – Minimum market conformity 
requirements for national support 
schemes
– Support scheme
– Decision bodies of Mediterra-
nean regulators and transmission 
companies
– Trade platform for the Mediter-
ranean
Energy infrastructure – Electricity grid adequacy – Regulation of grids – Grid operator and planner
– Infrastructure cost recovery 
instrument
– smart grid technology standards
Internal energy market – Reservation of balancing services – Balancing markets
– Security of electricity supply mecha-
nisms
– Balancing market codes
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Introduction 
We subsequently introduce the background and the 
scope of this report, as well as the analytical frame-
work used in this report and its structure. 
Background to this report
Following the European Council’s target to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions 80 to 95% below 1990 lev-
els by 2050 in order to keep climate change below 
2ºC1, the European Commission (DG2 Climate) re-
cently released a roadmap for a low carbon econo-
my by 2050 (EC, 2011a). This DG Climate roadmap 
communicates what could be the most cost-effective 
pathway to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
by 80% by 2050 relative to 1990 levels, which would 
imply domestic emission reductions of 93-99% in the 
power sector, 54-67% in the transport sector, 88-91% 
in the residential & tertiary sector, 83-87% in the in-
dustry sector, 42-49% in agriculture, and 70-78% in 
other sectors (Figure 1).
The European Commission also started to think 
about the possible role of the EU in these sectors. DG 
Move already released a transport roadmap that pro-
poses how the EU could guide the transition in the 
transport sector (EC, 2011h), and DG Energy has an-
nounced presenting its energy roadmap by the end 
of this year, 2011. These roadmaps are more policy-
1  Taking into account that total climate action from all 
countries will allow a global reduction of 50% in emissions by 
2050. The Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007) has concluded that a re-
duction of 50% to 85% in global GHG emission by 2050 com-
pared to the 2000 level is needed to limit the global temperature 
rise to 2.0-2.4ºC with respect to the temperature in pre-industrial 
times. According to more recent studies, a 50% GHG reduction 
may not be enough to avoid dangerous temperature increases 
(Allison at al, 2009). In this report we do not enter in the debate 
over whether 80‐95% GHG reduction for the EU is too ambitious 
or not ambitious enough to reach this temperature limit, or if the 
2ºC target is enough to prevent climate disruption.
2  The European Commission is organized in several Di-
rectorate Generals, referred to as the DGs. 
oriented, while the DG Climate roadmap is mainly a 
modeling exercise. Note that the transport policy pri-
orities highlighted in the transport roadmap (Annex 
2) interact with the energy policies discussed in this 
report, which is especially the case for the envisaged 
urban mobility plans and smart pricing and taxation. 
Scope of this report
The role of the EU in the transition towards a low car-
bon energy future is increasingly debated (Jones and 
Glachant, 2010). This debate has been taking place in 
a context where various visions of the path to follow 
are presented by stakeholders, and several member 
states have already started implementing policies to 
guide the transition. The main contribution of this re-
port is to first analyze this on-going process and then 
identify promising EU interventions in energy policy, 
based on the collected evidence. In the following we 
further detail the scope of our analysis.
Visions 
The visions analyzed within this report are recently 
released energy roadmaps that include a quantitative 
analysis for Europe3. They are from a diverse set of 
stakeholders: a European electricity industry associa-
tion (Eurelectric, 2010a), representatives of the Euro-
pean gas industry (EGAF, 2011), the European Cli-
mate Foundation (ECF, 2010), the intergovernmental 
International Energy Agency (IEA, 2010) and a non-
governmental environmental organization in coop-
eration with an association of the renewable energy 
industry (EREC/Greenpeace, 2010). We compare the 
visions of these stakeholders with the DG Climate 
roadmap (EC, 2011a), which presents the European 
Commission’s vision of a low-carbon economy and 
the most cost-effective pathway to achieve the desired 
3 This explains why, for instance, WWF (2011) is not 
considered, since it does not present a quantitative analysis for 
Europe.
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goal. 
Strategies
For what concerns the member states’ pioneering 
strategies, we include in the analysis those mem-
ber states that have low carbon energy policies with 
specific 2050 targets in place, i.e. Denmark, France, 
Finland, Ireland, Germany and the UK (for the re-
mainder of this report, we refer to them as the “pio-
neering member states”).4 By analyzing these selected 
visions and strategies, we identify the challenges that 
policy makers will need to address at member state 
and/or EU levels, and we also identify new risks of 
member states moving in different directions (“policy 
fragmentation”) and new opportunities for member 
states’ cooperation and European added value.
EU
With this report, we are advising DG Energy in the 
preparation of their roadmap. We focus on the first 
4 Note that these are not necessarily today’s pioneers. For 
instance, the UK during the last 10 years has only reached a share 
of renewable energy of around 3% (NREAP, 2010) in their gross 
consumption, while they need to reach 15% by 2020. 
steps that should already be undertaken today at the 
EU level. As a result, the report also takes today’s EU 
institutional boundary conditions as given. In other 
words, we are implicitly assuming that the EU is a 
multilateral agreement that is fixed. Even though it 
is out of the scope of this report, it is important to 
also further explore what could and should be a more 
ambitious approach to energy policy at the EU level.5
Energy policy
We consider the following six main energy-related 
policy areas: energy efficiency, GHG emissions, re-
newable energy, energy infrastructure, internal en-
ergy market, and technology innovation and R&D. 
Within these areas, we focus on the electricity sector 
because, “electricity will play a central role in the low 
carbon economy” (EC, 2011a). Even though this re-
port does not cover the other important sectors, such 
as the transport sector, included in the DG Climate 
5  Some have argued that energy policy cannot be effi-
cient and effective if sovereignty on energy policy in Europe is 
kept at a national level Lévêque (2008). It has been advocated that 
in addition to an internal energy market, the EU should aim to 
create a common energy policy or, more audaciously, a European 
energy community (Notre Europe, 2010). 
Figure 1 – EU GHG emissions towards 80% domestic reduction (compared to 1990 levels) Source: EC, 2011a
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roadmap (Annex 1), it does briefly reflect on the in-
teractions between the transformations in these sec-
tors and the transformation of the power sector. 
Analytical framework applied in the re-
port
We developed an analytical framework that distin-
guishes three different types of possible EU involve-
ment (Figure 2). 
– The first type of EU involvement corresponds to 
setting (binding) targets for member state actions. 
Member states still have total freedom to decide on 
how to achieve the targets. The EU creates added 
value by setting an objective for the EU as a whole, 
and by sharing the effort among member states, for 
instance, to ensure that every member state contrib-
utes to a European common interest.
– The second type of EU involvement is about fram-
ing the choice of measures taken by member states to 
achieve a certain objective. Member states still decide 
how to act or which instruments to use. The EU cre-
ates added value by harmonizing the approach taken 
by member states, for instance, by setting coherence 
requirements that member states need to comply 
with when working towards their objectives.
– The third type of EU involvement corresponds 
to the creation of an EU-wide instrument. Member 
states then rely on the performance of an EU instru-
ment to amplify the individual measures taken at the 
member state level. The EU creates added value by 
creating a level playing field, for instance, by intro-
ducing a European Emission Trading Scheme (EU-
ETS).
We use this analytical framework with three types of 
EU involvement to derive promising EU interven-
tions to deal with the key 2050 policy challenges.
Structure of the report
The report is organized in three chapters. Chapter 
1 introduces the different stakeholders’ visions and 
derives from them the main energy-related policy 
challenges. In Chapter 2, an overview is given on how 
pioneering member states are dealing with these key 
challenges and the risks of policy fragmentation; new 
opportunities for member state cooperation and Eu-
ropean added value are also identified. Chapter 3 is 
Figure 2 – Different types of EU involvement
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dedicated to the understanding of the possible role of 
the EU. Finally, the main recommendations deriving 
from the analysis are presented.
1. Stakeholder visions: what are 
the key 2050 policy challenges?
The stakeholders’ visions on a low carbon energy sys-
tem are introduced in this chapter. We report what 
the visions mention regarding the transition costs and 
benefits, and then continue with the identification of 
key policy challenges necessary to achieve them.
1.1 The transition cost and benefits
Stakeholders have presented alternative pathways 
towards a low carbon energy system in 2050 with 
slightly different geographic scopes6 and GHG emis-
6  Eurelectric considers the EU 27, while both EGAF and 
ECF consider all the countries from the EU 27 plus Switzerland 
and Norway. The scope from IEA and EREC/Greenpeace reports 
is OECD Europe which consists of 19 EU member states (Austria, 
sions’ reduction targets. In what follows, we discuss 
the differences in assumptions regarding: 1// fuel 
prices; and 2// technology development (Table 2).7
For the assumed fuel prices (Annex 3), IEA presents 
low fuel prices, based on the reference scenario of the 
IEA World Energy Outlook (WEO) (IEA, 2009a); it 
is assumed that fuel prices will decrease significantly 
towards 2050 as a result of the decreasing fuel con-
sumption. ECF fuel prices are slightly higher, based 
on the low carbon scenario included in IEA WEO 
Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Po-
land, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden and United King-
dom) plus Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey. 
7  Note that regarding economic growth, the stakehold-
ers have assumption of a slow and stable economic growth after 
2030 in common. Because the values used to report are not the 
same, it is not straightforward to compare assumptions. There is a 
difference in currency and different indicators are used to quanti-
fy growth; ECF and EGAF studies only present an average annual 
growth for the whole transition period, while the others present 
the expected value for GDP or GDP per capita.
Table 2 – Stakeholder visions
Stakeholder Vision GHG Target* Fuel Prices
Technologies Development
CCTS ** RES ***
Eurelectric Power Choices 75% Medium-High 2025 Low
European Gas Advo-
cacy Forum (EGAF)
Low gas price 80%
Medium-Low***** 2030 MediumHigh gas price 80%
Low gas price and constrained nuclear**** 80%
International Energy 
Agency (IEA)
BLUE Map 75% Low 2015-2025 High
European Climate 
Forum (ECF)
Roadmap 40% RES 80%
Medium-Low 2020 MediumRoadmap 60% RES 80%
Roadmap 80% RES 80%
EREC/ Greenpeace Energy [R]evolution 80% High Not needed Medium-High
* GHG emission reductions relative to 1990 levels
** Year when it is assumed to be commercially available
*** Learning rates (in qualitative terms)
**** Nuclear capacity constrained at 30GW by 2030
***** The fuel prices considered are the same as in the ECF report, except for gas, for which two different price scenarios (low and high) are 
considered. The high gas price scenario is the one corresponding to ECF values.
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(IEA, 2009a).8 EGAF uses the same assumptions on 
fuel prices as ECF, except for gas where two scenari-
os are considered: a high gas price scenario with the 
same gas prices as ECF and a low gas price scenario 
which assumes that gas prices remain low up to 2050. 
The Eurelectric fuel prices, based on their own calcu-
lations using the Prometheus model, are higher than 
in the reports above. EREC/Greenpeace has the high-
est assumed fuel prices based on the high price sensi-
tivity scenario in IEA WEO (IEA, 2009a). 
Looking at the assumed technology developments, 
different stakeholders do not count on the same tech-
nologies, as they have different assumptions regard-
ing the cost evolution of these technologies. For in-
stance, IEA projects that Carbon Capture Transport 
and Storage (CCTS) will be available between 2015 
and 2025, depending on the support that this tech-
nology will receive; ECF considers that CCTS tech-
nologies will be commercially available from 2020 on; 
Eurelectric considers these technologies from 2025 
on, and EGAF from 2030. EREC/Greenpeace does 
not believe in CCTS technologies. For renewable 
energy technologies, stakeholders do not report the 
same indicators. For instance, Eurelectric presents 
levelized costs and EREC/Greenpeace the evolution 
of investment and operation and maintenance costs, 
while IEA, ECF and EGAF studies present the learn-
ing rates of the different technologies. Nonetheless, 
Table 2 gives an indication of how these technologies 
are projected to develop in the different visions.
Despite the differences in the assumptions among 
the different visions, their outcomes concerning the 
overall cost of the transition are considerably similar. 
The visions have in common that they report that the 
transition would increase the need for investments so 
8  This low carbon scenario assumed the stabilization of 
the concentration of GHG in the atmosphere at 450 ppm CO2-eq, 
limiting the rise in global temperature by 20oC (IEA, 2009a).
that capital costs increase, while fuel costs decrease. 
Note that the increase in capital costs depends on the 
assumed technology development, while the fuel cost 
savings depend on the assumed fuel prices.9 In Eure-
lectric’s vision, the fuel cost savings do not fully com-
pensate the additional investment needed, compared 
to their baseline scenario. In the IEA’s vision, the ad-
ditional investments are lower than the cumulative 
fuel savings, compared to their baseline scenario. In 
ECF’s vision, the cost of energy is reported to decline 
by 20-30% over the total period. EGAF however ar-
gues that the ECF pathways are costlier and riskier 
than accounted for.10 The EREC/Greenpeace study 
reports an annual cost of electricity supply that is be-
low that of their baseline scenario. In other words, the 
visions agree that investment goes up, and fuel costs 
go down, but they do not fully agree on what will be 
the net effect.
Some stakeholders have also argued that their find-
ings are robust by showing that they also hold under 
different assumptions. For instance, Eurelectric per-
formed four sensitivity analyses in order to study the 
impact of changing their main assumptions, includ-
ing the delay on CCTS technologies development, 
the change in nuclear phase out policies, the tighter 
restrictions regarding on-shore wind installation and 
the inexistence of additional energy efficiency poli-
cies. The overall result is that in general there are no 
significant changes, neither on the target achieved 
nor in the overall costs of the transition.11 IEA also 
9  This is a simplification because, for instance, the de-
velopment of technology also has an impact on the fuel costs as 
more efficient conversion technologies can save fuel.
10  EGAF argues that a realistic and cost-efficient low 
carbon European strategy should take in consideration the con-
siderable stranded costs that are likely to derive from the aban-
donment of gas distribution and storage infrastructures and the 
consequent economical and societal burdens connected with the 
natural gas industry.
11  The inexistence of additional energy efficiency policies 
is the one with the highest impact both on the targets and on the 
costs, -7% and additional 3,552 billion Euros, respectively. 
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performed some sensitivity analysis regarding as-
sumptions in the different economic sectors (electric-
ity, buildings, industry and transports) in order to 
guarantee the robustness of their conclusions. Within 
the ECF study there is a sensitivity analysis, but its 
main goal has been to show that the power system 
can sustain a high share of renewable energy sources, 
even when considering extreme weather conditions 
and/or reductions on interconnections (among other 
changes in the system).
The DG Climate roadmap confirms the need for ad-
ditional investments in order to ensure the transition, 
which the roadmap considers to be about €270 bil-
lion12 annually during the period 2010-2050 (corre-
sponding to 1.5% of GDP). The roadmap also states 
that the net effect can be positive or negative depend-
ing on the fuel price developments, which are esti-
mated to be about €175 to 320 billion annually during 
the same period. 
Note that the stakeholder studies included here assess 
the policy costs mostly from an energy system analy-
sis. Transformational policies such as those needed 
to achieve a low carbon economy are likely however 
to have impacts on various sectors of the economy 
and on the trading balance of the EU, which can be 
negative (e.g. reduced competitiveness of energy in-
tensive industries) and/or positive (e.g. development 
of low carbon businesses). The DG Climate roadmap 
believes the net effect will be positive, considering the 
additional investments in the EU economy that will 
lead to an increase of competitiveness and jobs. Note 
also that the stakeholder studies compare the costs of 
the transition with a “business as usual” baseline sce-
nario, which is actually not the correct way to discuss 
whether or not we should follow the decarbonisation 
12  The biggest share of this amount would be invested in 
the transport sector (€150 billion), followed by the built environ-
ment (€75 billion) and the power sector (€30 billion).
path, we should rather be comparing the costs of cli-
mate change with the costs of the transition to miti-
gate climate change.
1.2 Key 2050 policy challenges
In this section, we identify the key policy challenges 
concerning the achievement of the stakeholders’ vi-
sions. Throughout the identification, we demonstrate 
that these challenges are in policy areas where the 
EU is indeed already active in the 2020 context: 1// 
energy efficiency; 2// GHG emissions; 3// renewable 
energy; 4// energy infrastructure; 5// internal energy 
markets; and 6// technology innovation and R&D 
(Table 3).
First, in the policy area of energy efficiency, the key 
challenge reported by stakeholders is to achieve am-
bitious energy savings. The ambition desired is not 
always comparable among the different studies since 
they do not present the necessary energy efficiency 
improvements using the same indicators. Eurelec-
tric and EREC/Greenpeace for instance report the 
primary energy savings that need to be achieved in 
their visions relative to a baseline, i.e. the reference 
scenario in IEA WEO (IEA, 2009a), while the others 
refer to the role of energy efficiency in terms of the 
GHG emissions’ reductions that are projected to be 
achieved with energy efficiency measures. The sav-
ings that need to be achieved in comparison with a 
baseline scenario are 20% in the case of Eurelectric, 
and 40% in the case of EREC/Greenpeace. In the 
IEA report, energy efficiency improvements reduce 
GHG emissions by 30%. ECF reports separate num-
bers for the building and the transport sectors, where 
45% and 20% of GHG reductions are expected to be 
achieved through energy efficiency improvements, 
respectively. The visions are therefore difficult to 
compare, but require a significant increase in efforts 
in this area in comparison with previous years. The 
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DG Climate Roadmap further emphasizes the impor-
tance of energy efficiency by considering it as the sin-
gle most important contribution to the achievement 
of the objectives.
Second, in the policy area of GHG emissions, the 
key challenge reported by stakeholders is to achieve a 
nearly zero-carbon electricity sector.13 The vision is to 
generate electricity mainly from low-carbon energy 
technologies, i.e. using renewable energy sources, nu-
clear and/or fossil fuels equipped with CCTS so that 
electricity can play an important role in decreasing 
also the emissions of the transport and heating sec-
tors. Eurelectric considers the highest level of electri-
fication for both sectors, followed by the ECF visions, 
while EREC/Greenpeace and IEA consider a higher 
direct use of renewable energy sources14 and a lower 
use of electricity. In the EGAF vision, a major con-
tribution could come shifting from coal power plants 
to gas with also an increased penetration of most ef-
ficient renewable technologies and the application 
of combined cycles to biomass electricity generation 
plants. Within the DG Climate Roadmap, electricity 
is considered to play a crucial role in the low carbon 
economy so that it also considers the decarbonisation 
of the electricity sector as a top priority. 
Third, in the policy area of renewable energy, the 
key challenge reported by stakeholders is achieving 
the ambitious renewable energy targets. There is an 
agreement that the use of renewable energy sources 
needs to continue to increase, both directly and in-
directly (through the use of electricity and heat and 
cooling generated from renewable energy sources). 
Concerning the use of renewable sources in electric-
13  See also Delarue et al. (2011).
14  Some of the most important indirect uses of renewable 
energy sources in these visions include solar thermal for domestic 
hot water; passive solar for space heating purposes and free cool-
ing through the use of mechanical ventilation, cooling towers, 
etc.; use of biomass and geothermal for heating purposes.
ity generation, the share ranges from 30-34% (EGAF) 
up to almost 100% (EREC/Greenpeace) of electricity 
generation in 2050. ECF presents three different vi-
sions with different shares on the use of renewable 
sources within the electricity sector, ranging from 
40% to 80%. IEA envisages that 50% of the electricity 
is produced from renewable energy sources. EGAF 
suggests postponing the main increase of renewables 
until after 2030.
Fourth, in the policy area of energy infrastructure, 
the key challenge reported by stakeholders is ensur-
ing electricity grid adequacy. The importance of the 
electricity grid, and especially the expansion of trans-
mission across borders, is emphasized in all visions. 
The expansion of interconnections that needs to be 
achieved in the different studies ranges from a 40% 
to more than 90% increase compared to today’s ca-
pacities. Note however that the focus on electricity 
transmission expansion, as opposed to smarter grids 
(which apply to both transmission and distribution 
grids) with more demand flexibility and storage, can 
be partly explained by the fact that today’s models are 
limited in how they represent smart grid technolo-
gies. Nonetheless, some of the visions already alert for 
the importance of not just expanding but also smart-
ening the grid; for instance, ECF shows the poten-
tial benefits of using demand flexibility and EREC/
Greenpeace refers to the need of a EU super-grid.15 
Moreover, the need to expand and smarten electricity 
grids is also highlighted in the DG Climate Roadmap. 
Fifth, in the policy area of the internal energy market, 
the key challenge reported by almost all stakeholders 
15  EREC/Greenpeace also released a more detailed study 
on the infrastructure needed to support the functioning of a Eu-
ropean power sector almost 100% fuelled by renewable energy 
sources (EREC/Greenpeace, 2009) where they mention the need 
for a new political framework to implement the necessary infra-
structure. This study has recently also been updated (Greenpeace, 
2011).
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is to ensure electricity supply security. Depending on 
the visions, the increase in generation capacity ranges 
from 50% (Eurelectric) to 164% (ECF 80% RES) of 
today’s generation capacity. This raises concerns for 
timely investments, which is especially the case for 
investments in system flexibility. As emphasized by 
all the studies, matching supply and demand, i.e. bal-
ancing, will become increasingly challenging with the 
increased penetration of renewable energy sources. 
ECF for instance reports that, even if the electricity 
transmission grid is expanded to reduce the need for 
back-up, the back-up capacity needs to be significant-
ly increased compared to today’s values, i.e. between 
170 to 270 GW of back-up capacity (equivalent to 22 
and 35% of the today’s installed capacity) in its vi-
sions with 40% up to 80% electricity generation based 
on renewable energy sources. EGAF reports a genera-
tion portfolio with more CCTS so that less back-up 
capacity is needed. As the amount of back-up capac-
ity that will be needed is uncertain, depending on the 
generation mix and the electricity transmission grid 
expansion, there are concerns that the market will 
not deliver in time or will not provide enough system 
flexibility. 
Sixth, within technology innovation and R&D, even 
if there is not an explicit challenge mentioned in the 
different visions, all of them assume certain technol-
ogy developments in order to allow the achievement 
of the intended goal. Indeed, technology innovation 
is a pre-condition for most of the challenges in the 
other policy areas: achievement of highly ambitious 
savings requires the use of technologies which are 
still not commercially available; the almost full decar-
bonisation of the electricity sector also relies on the 
increased efficiency of most renewable energy tech-
nologies for electricity generation and the develop-
ment of CCTS technologies; and research on smart 
grids and super grids. Within the recently released 
roadmap, the EC also shows a concern about guaran-
teeing the necessary investment in R&D, demonstra-
tion and early deployment of different technologies to 
ensure their cost-effective and large-scale penetration 
later-on.
The key 2050 policy challenges identified in this chap-
ter, as summarized in Table 3, are electricity focused. 
With the exception of the EGAF vision, the role of 
natural gas in the transition towards 2050 is not always 
fully clear, and not always explicitly discussed in the 
visions. We will come back to this issue in chapter 3.
Table 3 – Key 2050 policy challenges
Energy efficiency 
Ambitious energy savings 
GHG emissions 
Decarbonising the electricity sector
Renewable energy 
Ambitious renewable energy penetration levels
Energy infrastructure 
Electricity grid adequacy (expansion and smartening of the grid)
Internal energy market 
Electricity supply security (timely investments and system flexibility)
Technology innovation and R&D 
Technology development is a precondition for most of the above challenges
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2. Member state strategies: how 
are pioneers dealing with the key 
2050 policy challenges? 
In this chapter, we explore the low carbon energy pol-
icies with a view to 2050 that are emerging in pioneer-
ing EU member states. We do not assess the status 
of the member states policy towards the 2020 target, 
we only focus on the member states that have started 
actions with a longer term target. We first compare 
the status of the 2050 policy production process, and 
then compare what these member states are doing in 
order to identify new risks of policy fragmentation 
and new opportunities for member states’ coopera-
tion and EU added value.
2.1 Status of the political process
In what follows, we discuss the status of the political 
process of member states already mobilized towards 
a low-carbon energy future for 2050 in terms of 1// 
exploring policy options; 2// legal commitment; and 
3// implementation (Table 4). 
The first step corresponds to exploring policy op-
tions. 
– The Danish government established the Commis-
sion on Climate Change Policy in 2008 to develop 
proposals to decarbonise and to become independent 
of fossil fuels. This commission, which consisted of 
10 independent experts, published their recommen-
dations in 2010 (DCCCP, 2010) and, based on these 
recommendations, the Danish government recently 
released a strategic roadmap to achieve independ-
ence from coal, oil and gas and to significantly reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 (TDG, 2011). 
– In Finland, the government approved the “Long-
term Climate and Energy Strategy” (GOF, 2008) in 
2008 with detailed proposals on climate and energy 
policy measures up to 2020, and suggestions up to 
2050. In 2009, the government has published the 
“Foresight Report on Long-term Climate and Energy 
Policy” (PMO, 2009) to supplement the 2008 strategy, 
setting GHG targets up to 2050 and outlining longer-
term climate policies; this report is based on a set of 
studies commissioned by the government to expert 
groups and on public consultations of stakeholders, 
experts and citizens. 
– In France, the government initiated a debate with 
different stakeholders (including local authorities, 
trade unions, business, NGOs) on ecological and sus-
tainable development in 2007, i.e. the “Grenelle de 
l’environnement”, which has resulted in a set of rec-
ommendations (Tuot, 2007). 
– The German government has developed its low 
carbon energy policy, i.e. “Energiekonzept” (FMET, 
2010) based on a study that models different scenar-
ios on the future of the German energy sector (Prog-
nos et al., 2010). 
– In Ireland, the previous government released a 
Climate Change Bill in 2010 with the goal of legally 
establishing a target of 80% GHG reduction by 2050 
(MEHLG, 2010). The bill also foresees the creation of 
an Expert Advisory Body that, with the support of the 
Irish Environmental Protection Agency, would give 
the Minister of the Environment the political, eco-
nomic and technological advice necessary to define 
the specific policy measures to reach the target. 
– In the UK, the climate policy with a 2050 target 
started with the previous government that established 
the Committee on Climate Change (CCC, 2008) and 
used its advice to develop a low carbon energy system 
transition plan (HMG, 2009). 
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Secondly, there is the need for a legal commitment. 
This step has not yet been achieved by all the member 
states referred to in this paper. 
– In Denmark, the government will launch a review 
of current legislation in several areas such as electric-
ity supply and regulation, energy efficiency, use of bi-
ogas, etc. 
– In Finland, the “Long-term Climate and Energy 
Strategy 2008” was endorsed by the Parliament on 
June 2009 and the government is considering the pos-
sibility of supporting a Climate Change Act similar to 
the UK Act 2008 (UK, 2008).
– In France, the “Grenelle de l’environnement” ini-
tiative has already led to two legal commitments, i.e. 
“Grenelle I”, enacted in 2009, that sets the general pol-
icy without practical implementation or funding, and 
“Grenelle II”, released in 2010, which defines specific 
targets and actions. 
– In Germany, the law corresponding to the “Ener-
giekonzept” was supposed to be voted on in 2011. Af-
ter the recent events in Japan, Germany is however 
reconsidering its strategy.
– In Ireland, the Climate Change bill is still pend-
ing.16 
– In the UK, a first legislative action has already been 
taken in 2008 with the Climate Change Act (UK, 
2008), mandating to cut GHG emissions with 80% by 
2050 relative to 1990 levels.17,18 Furthermore, an ad-
16  In Ireland, after the elections in February 2011, a new coali-
tion leads the government, and it had not yet defined its climate policy at 
the time of our analysis, which is why Ireland is not discussed in the next 
section. 
17  This act also officially established the Committee on 
Climate Change as an independent advisory body.
18  According to the Climate Act, the Committee on Cli-
mate Change recommends to the government the level of carbon 
budget (which is the maximum level of GHG allowed in the UK) 
in a five-year period. The government in turn must propose a 
budget before Parliament. In the first report in 2008 (CCC, 2008) 
the Committee on Climate Change recommended the level of the 
first three budgets, covering the period up to 2022 and the par-
liament subsequently legislated in line with its recommendations 
(HMG, 2011). In December 2010, the Committee on Climate 
Change published recommendations for the fourth budget (CCC, 
Table 4 – Status of the political process of member states’ climate policies for 2050
Member state Exploring policy options Legal commitment Implementation
Denmark
– Committee on Climate 
Change




– Long-term Climate and 
Energy Strategy(GOF, 2008)
– Foresight Report on Long-
term Climate and Energy 
Policy (PMO, 2009)
– In 2009 the parliament 
endorsed the Long-term 
Climate and Energy 
Strategy
– Expected report by government
France
– Grenelle de l’environnement – Grenelle law I 2009
– Grenelle law II 2010
– 201 pending decrees
– Annual status report by government
Germany
– Energieszenarien für ein 
Energiekonzept der Bun-
desregierung (Prognos et al., 
2010)
– Energiekonzept law 
will not be voted on, as 
strategy changed
– Expected status report by government every 3 
years
Ireland – Expert Advisory Body* / – Annual report by the Expert Advisory Body
UK
– Committee on Climate 
Change
– Electricity Market Reform 
Project (EMR, 2010)
– Climate Change Act 2008
Energy Act 2010
– Additional legislation 
foreseen in 2011
– Annual Progress report by the Commission on 
Climate Change
– Carbon budget update every 5 years
– Annual status report by government
* Defined in the Climate Change Bill 2010, which has not yet been enacted (MEHLG, 2010).
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ditional law, the Energy Act 2010 (HMG, 2010b), was 
voted on in April 2010 in order to implement part of 
the transition plan prepared by the government. New 
legislative proposals are expected in 2011.19
The third step is the implementation of the defined 
measures/policies. 
– In Denmark, the roadmap by the government has 
only been released very recently so the envisaged ini-
tiatives for 2050 have not yet been implemented. 
– In Finland, an initial report on the implementation 
of the new measures defined in the Foresight Report 
will be drawn up by the current government. 
– In France, 201 decrees need to be implemented for 
the laws to become effective (CDD, 2010), which is 
foreseen for 2012. According to the Grenelle laws, the 
French government will need to report on the status 
of the implementation of this policy on a yearly basis. 
– Similarly, in Germany this step has also not been 
accomplished but it is foreseen that the government 
will need to monitor and report on progress every 
three years. 
– In Ireland, if the Climate Change Bill passes, the 
Expert Advisory Body shall prepare an annual report 
to the government on the progress towards the imple-
mentation of the low carbon policies. 
2010b), covering the years 2023-27, based on which the govern-
ment will propose further legislation in spring 2011.
19  After the election in May 2010, the government 
changed, but the new conservative-liberal coalition also has a 
set of measures on its agenda to fulfill the ambitious low carbon 
targets put in place under the previous government. The meas-
ures seem to be largely in line with the policies of the previous 
government (HMG, 2010a), but there are also new elements. The 
new government has started a series of consultations for a wide 
reform of the electricity market in the context of climate change. 
See: http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/consultations/emr/
emr.aspx.
– In the UK, the Committee on Climate Change, in 
addition to the carbon budget recommendations, is 
realizing yearly progress reports and it has already 
published the first two (CCC, 2009; CCC, 2010a), ad-
vocating that even stronger measures need to be tak-
en, such as the introduction of a carbon floor price. 
In addition, the Energy Act 2010 requires the govern-
ment to present regular reports on the progress of de-
carbonisation policies.
2.2 Strategies to deal with the key 
2050 policy challenges
We now analyze how member states deal with the 
policy challenges identified in the previous chapter: 
1// achieving ambitious energy savings; 2// decarbon-
ising the electricity sector; 3// achieving the ambitious 
renewable energy levels; 4// ensuring electricity grid 
adequacy; 5// ensuring electricity supply security; 
6// technology innovation and R&D. Can we already 
identify in these climate policies new risks of policy 
fragmentation and new opportunities for member 
states’ cooperation and European added value?
To achieve ambitious energy savings (i.e. key chal-
lenge identified in chapter 1 for the energy efficiency 
policy area), all countries consider the building sec-
tor to be the one with the highest potential for reduc-
tions, and they all propose important policy changes 
in order to lever the efficiency improvements in this 
sector. The Danish strategy focuses on renovation of 
buildings, which will be financed via grid tariffs. In 
Finland, after 2012, energy standards for new build-
ing will be amended to facilitate a gradual transition 
to passive houses. In France, the increase of build-
ing efficiency is considered as the measure with the 
highest potential, even when considering other policy 
areas. Indeed, the French target is to achieve a 38% 
reduction of the overall energy consumption within 
the building sector by 2020 and, in order to achieve 
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this, they intend to develop stricter building regula-
tions for both new and refurbished buildings, defin-
ing minimum performance standards and minimum 
annual refurbishment rates. In Germany, the target is 
to reduce the overall energy consumption by 20% by 
2020 and by 50% by 2050 relative to 2008 levels. This 
strategy relies on the establishment of a special fund 
to subsidize a wide range of measures for consum-
ers, industries and local communities to increase en-
ergy efficiency, including in buildings. As in France, 
the intention in Germany is also to develop stricter 
building regulations for both new and existing build-
ings. Also in the UK, the priority regarding energy 
savings is to improve energy efficiency in homes, 
businesses and public buildings. The UK government 
has launched the “Green Deal”, a plan to provide up-
front financing of energy efficiency improvements 
which the consumer pays back through their energy 
bills (DECC, 2010). In other words, we do see that the 
building sector20 is strongly targeted by low-carbon 
energy policies at the member state level, but the ap-
proaches seem to diverge substantially.
Regarding decarbonisation of the electricity sector 
(i.e. key challenge identified in chapter 1 for the GHG 
emissions policy area), all the countries have in com-
mon that they only consider low-carbon electricity 
generation technologies for 2050. Nonetheless, the 
technology strategies are quite different from coun-
try to country. For instance, Denmark and Germany 
(after the Fukushima accident) do not consider nu-
clear as an option, while in France a large share of its 
electricity generation is still expected to come from 
nuclear power plants. The French electricity sector is 
expected to be already almost decarbonised by 2020, 
20  Besides improving building efficiency, the member 
states analyzed also consider relevant the increase of energy effi-
ciency in other sectors, such as transport. Germany has a target to 
reduce energy consumption in transportation of 10% by 2020 and 
of 50% by 2050. France wants to expand public transportation in 
order to reduce energy consumption within the sector.
assuming that it achieves the 20% national renewable 
energy target for 2020. Now that Germany decided to 
phase out nuclear by 2020, natural gas is likely to play 
a role as a bridging technology in Germany. In the 
case of the UK, the government wants to push CCTS 
and nuclear is also considered a valid low carbon op-
tion.21 In the case of Finland, the government sup-
ports all low carbon technologies, including nuclear 
with the Olkiluoto Nuclear Power Plant currently 
under construction. In other words, there are diverg-
ing strategies in terms of the generation mix, which 
creates new risks for policy fragmentation. A first il-
lustration of policy fragmentation is the decision of 
the UK government to introduce a carbon floor for 
electricity generation from 2013 on (HMT, 2011).
Concerning the achievement of the ambitious re-
newable energy levels (i.e. key challenge identified in 
chapter 1 for the renewable energy policy area), coun-
tries have different views of the strategic technologies 
they intend to develop by 2050, and renewable en-
ergy technologies are not the only strategic ones con-
sidered to be supported. In Denmark, biomass and 
wind-power are the ones that need to be pushed, and 
the government has planned to expand renewable en-
ergy continuing to levy costs on electricity consum-
ers through the use of Public Service Obligations. In 
Germany, the original Energiekonzept strategy was to 
use renewable energy for 50% of the electricity con-
sumed in 2030, going up to 65% in 2040, and 80% 
in 2050, but these numbers might change now that 
nuclear will not anymore be the bridging technology 
in Germany. In any case, the Germany strategy relies 
on the national support scheme to push its strategic 
21  About nuclear, there has been a change of emphasis 
in UK policy. While the previous government supported nuclear 
technology, in the new government the Liberal Democrats have 
long opposed any new nuclear construction. According to the 
program of the new government new nuclear power plants will 
be possible but without public subsidy for construction (HMG, 
2010a).
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renewable energy technologies. Finland and the UK 
fully support renewable energy technologies but do 
not have long term targets for them because they are 
also open to developing other low carbon technolo-
gies, namely CCTS and nuclear. In other words, also 
regarding renewable energy policies, there are new 
risks of policy fragmentation.
Regarding electricity grid adequacy (i.e. key chal-
lenge identified in chapter 1 for the energy infrastruc-
ture policy area), important actions are foreseen in 
the different countries. The Danish strategy is based 
on further integration of its electricity grid into Eu-
rope and especially into the northern European grid. 
Also the German strategy is to take the initiative of 
developing an integrated Europe-wide grid. In ad-
dition to cross border infrastructure, the member 
states’ climate policies recognize that it is fundamen-
tal to extend and develop the internal grid. The Ger-
man government is developing a long-term plan for 
2050 to develop and extend the national electricity 
network, especially focused to connect offshore wind 
farms, and it is creating the legal and financial condi-
tions for a rapid expansion through easier licensing 
procedures and better investment mechanisms. The 
German government will also support the installa-
tion of smart meters. In the UK, in order to develop 
a national grid that can accommodate a large share 
of low-carbon technologies, the Energy Act 2010 
(HMG, 2010b) redefines the role of the regulator who 
must now officially help the government to tackle cli-
mate change.22 In Denmark the Commission on Cli-
22  In 2010, the national regulatory authority for electric-
ity and gas, OFGEM, defined a new regulatory framework de-
signed to promote grid smartness, i.e. the so-called RIIO model, 
replacing the RPI-X model (OFGEM, 2010). OFGEM also allo-
cated £500m over 5 years for the Low Carbon Networks Fund 
to support smart grid trials and, in collaboration with the De-
partment of Energy and Climate Change, has established a new 
regulatory regime for offshore transmission networks to secure 
the connection of offshore wind. In addition to that, the UK gov-
ernment and OFGEM are collaborating to roll out smart meters 
in every home by 2019 (DECC, 2011).
mate Change recommends the government to define 
a specific plan for developing an intelligent energy 
network in collaboration with the national TSO and 
the electricity grid distribution companies. In other 
words, there are new opportunities to cooperation in 
the development of electricity grids, and pioneering 
member states seem to be willing to further integrate 
their electricity transmission grids to enable their 
low-carbon energy strategies.
To ensure electricity supply security (i.e. key chal-
lenge identified in chapter 1 for the internal energy 
market policy area), one of the strategies considered 
by member states is to further integrate the national 
electricity markets. The Danish policy is based on a 
further integration of its electricity market into Eu-
rope and especially into the northern European re-
gion. Also the German strategy is to support integra-
tion of the electricity (and gas) markets. In the UK 
low-carbon energy policies have triggered an electric-
ity market reform process. The study that supports the 
ongoing public consultation (EMF, 2010) argues that 
an electricity generation capacity mechanism needs 
to be reintroduced in the UK to mitigate the security 
of supply risk. The study considers two options, i.e. a 
capacity payment for all, or a targeted capacity tender. 
Both would increase capacity margins and reduce 
risks to security of supply, but the study suggests that 
the tendering is the most appropriate option; one of 
the main reasons is that the alternative would imply a 
radical change that may create obstacles for the future 
integration of the UK market with the rest of Europe. 
Also in France, a market reform process is ongoing, 
and similar to the discussions in the UK, the inten-
tion is to introduce a generation capacity mechanism 
(Lévêque, 2011). The cases of France and the UK il-
lustrate that generation capacity mechanisms are in-
creasingly considered at the member state level, and 
because these mechanisms are currently national in 
scope, there is a new risk of electricity market frag-
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mentation in Europe.
Regarding technology development (i.e. the key chal-
lenge identified in chapter 1 for the technology innova-
tion and R&D policy area), pioneering member state 
envisage action at the national as well as the EU level. 
– National level. In Germany, funding for R&D will 
be increased from 2011 onwards and an Energy Re-
search Program will be defined before the end of this 
year with specific actions up to 2020 and an outline 
of central priorities for the period thereafter. It will 
mainly focus on RES, energy efficiency and energy 
storage. In the UK, the Department of Energy and 
Climate Change is supporting low carbon energy re-
search, and it is funding demonstration and pre-com-
mercial deployment projects through the Environ-
mental Transformation Fund and the Low Carbon 
Investment Funding. Specific on CCTS, the Energy 
Act 2010 has introduced incentives to support the 
construction of four commercial-scale demonstra-
tion projects, and the new government wants to es-
tablish an emissions performance standard to build 
new coal-fired power plants equipped with sufficient 
CCTS to meet the emissions performance standard. 
Also in Finland, the government plans to develop 
and test CCTS. In Denmark, the R&D sector has a 
key role in the low carbon climate policy especially 
regarding wind power. In the context of the strategic 
roadmap for 2050, the Danish government will un-
dertake a review of the public support for R&D in 
order to better coordinate all the government actions 
and to focus the efforts towards areas where support 
for research would have the greatest societal value. 
Moreover the Danish government wants to involve 
the business community more in this sector also en-
tering into partnerships with private enterprises, and 
plans to actively support larger pilot tests like the 
wind turbine test centre at Østerild. 
– EU level. The German government will support the 
implementation of the Strategic Energy Technology 
Plan (SET Plan) and in this context two CCTS dem-
onstration projects eligible for EU funding are expect-
ed to be built by 2020; these tests will be important for 
the government to decide on future implementation 
of this technology. Denmark will support a doubling 
of the EU future funds for R&D up to 2020 in the 
energy and climate change areas. In France, public 
funding for the R&D in the energy sector has always 
been largely focused on nuclear energy. Following the 
Grenelle debate, the French government has decided 
to allocate more than a billion Euros up until 2012 in 
research for energy efficiency, for low carbon trans-
portation and especially for renewable energy and 
CCTS, making the public support for these technolo-
gies comparable with the support for nuclear.
3. EU involvement: possible role 
of the EU in addressing the key 2050 
policy challenges
In this chapter, we first discuss why the EU has a role 
to play in addressing the key 2050 policy challenges 
we have identified in the previous chapters (“Ration-
ale for EU involvement”), to then use our analytical 
framework to derive policy options that are promis-
ing to address these challenges (“Three types of EU 
involvement”). Finally, the chapter illustrates the 
need for an integrated policy package.
3.1 Rationale for EU involvement
In 2006, the European Commission published the 
Green Paper “A European Strategy for Sustainable, 
Competitive and Secure Energy” that calls for a com-
mon European energy policy. This then led to the 
“third energy liberalisation package”23 to complete 
23  The third package (EU, 2009f) consists of five legisla-
tive texts: (1) a Directive revisiting the internal market for elec-
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the liberalization process in Europe, and the “climate 
and energy package”24 with the so-called “20-20-20” 
targets for 2020: 
– 20% reduction in primary energy use compared 
to projected levels for 2020, to be achieved by im-
proving energy efficiency;
– 20% reduction in EU GHG emission below 1990 
levels;
– 20% of final EU energy consumption from renew-
able resources.
From the legal point of view (Lisbon Treaty), envi-
ronment and energy are among the areas where there 
is a shared competence between the EU and member 
states (Conference, 2007). From the economic point 
of view, the rationale for the EU involvement is about 
1// assuring commitment; 2// internalizing externali-
ties; and 3// reducing costs.
First issue is assuring commitment. The transition re-
quires massive investments, while the path towards 
a low carbon energy system in 2050 is long and full 
of uncertainties. This implies that a political commit-
ment is needed to give the necessary confidence to 
investors. For instance, within the 2020 climate and 
energy package, member states have legally commit-
ted to reduce GHG emission and increase renewable 
energy through binding targets defined at the EU 
tricity; (2) a Directive revisiting the internal market for natural 
gas; (3) a Regulation on conditions for access to the natural gas 
transmission networks; (4) a Regulation revisiting the conditions 
for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electric-
ity; (5) a Regulation establishing an Agency for the Cooperation 
of Energy Regulators.
24  The climate and energy package consists of four leg-
islative texts: (1) a Directive revising the EU ETS; (2) an “effort-
sharing” Decision setting binding national targets for emissions 
from sectors not covered by the EU ETS; (3) a Directive setting 
binding national targets for increasing the share of renewable en-
ergy sources in the energy mix; and (4) a Directive creating a legal 
framework for the safe and environmentally sound use of carbon 
capture and storage technologies.
level. The targets have been fixed according to the 
wealth and existing mitigation opportunities of each 
country.
Second issue is internalizing externalities. National 
measures often have implications for other mem-
ber states, which can be both positive and/or nega-
tive. The EU involvement can then also be justified 
by potential externalities resulting from member 
state actions as well as by fairness and equity issues. 
As internal energy markets and grids will be increas-
ingly interdependent in the transition towards a low 
carbon future, the EU has an important role to play 
in addressing these externalities (e.g. grid adequacy, 
electricity supply security, etc).
Third issue is reducing costs. Some actions can be 
more effective if they are defined and organized at the 
EU level. This is the case for the EU ETS scheme for 
example, which is a successful instrument that works 
well on the European scale, which would probably 
not have worked on the national scale. 
In other words, the EU has a role to play in address-
ing the key 2050 policy challenges we have identified 
in the previous chapters. The economic rationale for 
EU involvement in energy policy today, i.e. assuring 
commitment, internalizing externalities and reduc-
ing costs, is becoming even more important in the 
2050 context. 
3.2 Three possible types of EU 
involvement
In this section, we use our analytical framework to 
derive policy options that are promising to address 
the key 2050 policy challenges in the six main energy 
policy areas. We first discuss this with a case-by-case 
approach, to then apply the approach to the six policy 
areas.
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3.2.1 Case-by-case approach
A case-by-case approach is necessary because the 
framework only suggests the different types of EU in-
volvement to consider in each policy area. In some 
policy areas, a combination of the three types of EU 
involvement can be promising, while in other policy 
areas it can be more appropriate to have only one or 
no type of EU involvement (Figure 2). 
– The first type of EU involvement (“effort sharing” 
by setting binding targets for member state action) 
can create EU added value when there is a common 
European interest that will not be pursued or that will 
be achieved too slowly/costly if not all member states 
contribute. 
– The second type of EU involvement (“harmoni-
zation” by framing the choice of measures taken by 
member states) can create EU added value when 
there is policy fragmentation and this situation is 
costly due to incoherence. 
– The third type of EU involvement (“level playing 
field” by creating an EU-wide instrument) can create 
EU added value when a harmonized approach is ben-
eficial, and there is strong enough agreement among 
member states on what the most appropriate instru-
ment to be applied is.
Note also that some policies are simply better ad-
dressed at the member state level because, for in-
stance, this allows for policy experimentation in an 
area where it is unclear what the target should be and 
what the most appropriate policy instrument to use to 
achieve the target is.
3.2.2 Energy efficiency
In what follows, we identify promising interventions 
to address the key energy efficiency policy challenge 
in the 2050 context, i.e. to achieve ambitious energy 
savings.
First type of EU involvement: “effort sharing” 
Binding energy savings targets for 2020 and beyond, 
i.e. overall targets as well as sector specific targets.
This is a promising EU intervention because of three 
main reasons: 1// affordability of the transition; 2// 
history of indicative energy saving targets not being 
achieved; 3// increased risk of locking-in into energy 
inefficient technologies and assets with a long lifetime.
First reason is the affordability of the transition. The 
visions discussed in chapter 1 indeed indicate that the 
transition cost is sensitive to achievement of energy 
saving ambitions so that not achieving these ambi-
tions can endanger the affordability of the transition. 
Second reason is the history of indicative energy 
saving targets not being achieved. The current (and 
previous) lack of progress towards indicative targets 
suggests that binding national targets are needed for 
2020 (Ecofys and Fraunhofer, 2010). The target of 
20% reduction of the EU primary energy consump-
tion in 2020 compared to a baseline scenario will in-
deed not be met with the existing policy (Figure 3) 
(EC, 2011b). 
Third reason is the increased risk of locking-in into 
energy inefficient technologies and assets with a long 
lifetime. This is especially the case for buildings and 
transport infrastructures. The existing proposal to 
require public authorities to refurbish at least 3% of 
their buildings each year (EC, 2011b) would already 
be a step in this direction, but the member state strat-
egies discussed in chapter 2 indicate that even more 
ambitious targets may be needed for buildings in the 
2050 context.
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Second type of EU involvement: “harmonization” 
Coherence requirements for measuring and reporting 
tools for energy saving measures 
This is a promising EU intervention because of two 
main reasons: 1// local character of many energy sav-
ing measures; 2// reporting failure.
First reason is the local character of many energy sav-
ing measures. Local characteristics can be cultural 
and social (mobility patterns, average dwelling size, 
etc.), natural (climate, local topography, etc.) and/or 
economic (average income per household, main lo-
cal economic activities, etc.). Because of these local 
characteristics, it is not necessarily opportune to har-
monize member state approaches, but measuring and 
reporting tools will need to be harmonized anyway to 
facilitate the spreading of the good practices.
Second reason is reporting failure. The previous 
THINK report on “Smart cities: fostering a quick 
transition towards sustainable local energy systems” 
(THINK, 2011b) identified the reporting failure that 
currently exists at the city level (Box 1), and argued 
that it needs to be addressed at the EU level with a 
harmonization of measuring and reporting tools for 
energy saving measures.
The EU has already been successful in voluntar-
ily committing city authorities to reduce their CO2 
emissions with at least 20% by 2020 (Covenant of 
Mayors). In the context of the Covenant, a methodo-
logical framework has been developed to help signa-
tories to elaborate their baseline emissions inventory 
and their so-called Sustainable Energy Action Plans 
(SEAP). It is also mandatory for Covenant signato-
ries to produce a report every second year to monitor 
progress.
The SEAP template already requires city authorities 
to set targets, and list a set of actions to reach the 
targets, with the built environment, the local energy 
networks, and the urban transport systems integrated 
in one plan. Cities however often use different ap-
proaches in defining what sectors to include in their 
reporting, in establishing the geographic boundaries 
Figure 3 – Development and projection of primary energy use for the EU by 2020
Source: EC, 2011i
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Box 1. City level “reporting failure” (THINK, 2011b)
The EU has already been successful in voluntarily com-
mitting city authorities to reduce their CO2 emissions 
with at least 20% by 2020 (Covenant of Mayors). In the 
context of the Covenant, a methodological framework 
has been developed to help signatories to elaborate 
their baseline emissions inventory and their so-called 
Sustainable Energy Action Plans (SEAP). It is also man-
datory for Covenant signatories to produce a report 
every second year to monitor progress.
The SEAP template already requires city authorities to 
set targets, and list a set of actions to reach the targets, 
with the built environment, the local energy networks, 
and the urban transport systems integrated in one 
plan. Cities however often use different approaches 
in defining what sectors to include in their reporting, 
in establishing the geographic boundaries of the area 
included (i.e. what is a “city”), as well as in aggregat-
ing data (Croci et al., 2010; OECD, 2010; CEPS, 2010), 
and the Covenant also allows cities to use different 
accounting methodologies, for both CO2 emissions 
and energy consumption. It is therefore necessary 
to evolve towards a more uniform methodological 
framework for smart cities. Alternatively, the inter-
operability between the existing methods could be 
improved so that cities can be compared even if they 
do not use the same reporting methodology (CEPS, 
2010). 
The framework could also account for a context to 
improve comparison between groups of cities. It is for 
instance important to measure the effect of the plans 
against a “likely future without a plan” rather than 
against the present. This issue is particularly relevant 
to filter out the on-going changes at the higher pol-
icy levels that have an impact on the performance of 
the local level, such national policies that impact the 
generation mix in a certain country and therefore the 
emissions associated with consuming electricity on 
the local level.
The reporting and monitoring framework should also 
enter into the project level, while the Covenant stays 
at a more aggregated level. Cities could for instance 
be asked to present a curve with the abatement costs 
of all proposed measures, allowing a better under-
standing of the cost-effectiveness of the different op-
tions (CEPS, 2010).
of the area included (i.e. what is a “city”), as well as 
in aggregating data (Croci et al., 2010; OECD, 2010; 
CEPS, 2010), and the Covenant also allows cities to 
use different accounting methodologies, for both 
CO2 emissions and energy consumption. It is there-
fore necessary to evolve towards a more uniform 
methodological framework for smart cities. Alterna-
tively, the interoperability between the existing meth-
ods could be improved so that cities can be compared 
even if they do not use the same reporting methodol-
ogy (CEPS, 2010). 
The framework could also account for a context to 
improve comparison between groups of cities. It is 
for instance important to measure the effect of the 
plans against a “likely future without a plan” rather 
than against the present. This issue is particularly rel-
evant to filter out the on-going changes at the higher 
policy levels that have an impact on the performance 
of the local level, such national policies that impact 
the generation mix in a certain country and therefore 
the emissions associated with consuming electricity 
on the local level.
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The reporting and monitoring framework should also 
enter into the project level, while the Covenant stays 
at a more aggregated level. Cities could for instance 
be asked to present a curve with the abatement costs 
of all proposed measures, allowing a better under-
standing of the cost-effectiveness of the different op-
tions (CEPS, 2010).
Third type of EU involvement: “level playing field” 
EU good practice forum or register 
This is a promising EU intervention because it would 
support the spreading of good practices. The har-
monization of measuring and reporting tools for 
energy saving measures (second type of EU involve-
ment) will have a bigger impact if supported by an 
EU-instrument (third type of EU involvement) that 
registers the proven records and actively disseminates 
them.
Third type of EU involvement:  
“EU level playing field” 
EU benchmarking of cities 
This is a promising EU intervention because it could 
mobilize cities towards a low carbon future. Cities are 
home to about 80% of Europeans and are responsi-
ble for about the same share of total primary energy 
use and carbon dioxide emissions (Eurostat, 2009). A 
global solution for climate change, even if achievable, 
would rely on the willingness of these citizens to co-
operate so it is essential to have policies at multiple 
levels, including at the city level (Ostrom, 2009). A 
promising intervention would be to require cities to 
report about their progress or lack of progress. This 
information could then be used to do an EU level 
benchmark report to better identify cities that have 
the capacity to act with the potential for a significant 
impact, but are not yet moving towards a local sus-
tainable energy system (THINK, 2011b). 
To sum up, Table 6 lists the most promising interven-
tions in the energy efficiency policy area. Note that 
the recent Energy Efficiency Action Plan25 is already a 
step in the right direction.
3.2.3 Greenhouse gas emissions
In what follows, we identify promising interventions 
to address the key greenhouse gas emissions policy 
challenge in the 2050 context, i.e. to decarbonize the 
electricity sector.
First type of EU involvement: “effort sharing” 
Binding GHG reduction targets beyond 2020, i.e. more 
stringent and credible long term caps.
This is a promising EU intervention because the tran-
sition to 2050 requires a long term steep decarbonisa-
tion, which requires a credible long term carbon price 
signal. In the 2009 revision of the EU ETS, it was 
25  The plan EC (2011b) is focused on reinforcing the existing 
Directives by proposing more stringent standards (for the industry sec-
tor e.g., through energy efficiency requirements for industrial equipment) 
and pushing energy efficiency to be a priority within the different sectors 
(e.g. it promotes the exemplary role of the public sector, by increasing the 
refurbishment rate of public buildings and introducing energy efficiency 
criteria in public spending).
Table 6 – Promising interventions in the energy efficiency policy area
First type of EU involvement
“effort sharing”
Second type of EU involvement
“harmonization”
Third type of EU involvement
“level playing field”
Binding targets for
– Energy savings beyond 2020
– Overall and sector specific energy savings
Coherence requirements for
– Measuring and reporting to facilitate spreading 
of good practices 
EU
- Good practice forum or register
- Benchmarking of cities
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agreed to introduce an EU-wide cap from 2013 on for 
the EU ETS sectors,26 replacing the existing national 
caps. The EU-cap will decrease yearly by 1.74% of the 
average annual total quantity of allowances issued by 
the member states in years 2008-2012. As a result, the 
number of allowances available to EU ETS sectors in 
2020 will be 21% below the 2005 level (EC 2010a, EC 
2010b), which is in line with the binding 2020 target.
Note also that this linear path to decrease the EU-cap 
does not stop in 2020, implying that the EU already 
started defining emission caps beyond 2020 (EU, 
2009c), but it could be important to launch a stronger 
signal to the investors that the EU is committed to 
continue its climate policy beyond 2020, that these 
caps are reliable and that they will become stronger 
in time.
Second type of EU involvement: “harmonization” 
Coherence between carbon pricing and renewable 
energy targets 
The approach of member states to reducing the GHG 
emissions of the electricity sector is already harmo-
nized. Indeed, there is the EU-ETS to trade allow-
ances, and from 2013 the initial allocation of allow-
ances will also be harmonized with the introduction 
of auctioning27 as the default method for the electric-
ity sector.28,29 
26  The EU ETS is one of the pillars of the EU policy to combat 
climate change in the context of the 2020 package. It is the largest multi-
national emissions trading scheme in the world, it covers around 40% of 
the GHG emissions in the EU, including sectors as power generation, iron 
and steel, glass, cement, pottery and bricks.
27  Starting in 2013, the share of auctioning will gradually in-
crease. Particularly in the electricity sector, free allocations have led to 
wind-fall profits (EC, 2008b; Keppler and Cruciani, 2010; Lévêque et al., 
2009). Due to risk of carbon leakage, certain energy-intensive sectors can 
however continue to get all their allowances for free.
28  The Directive 2009/29/EC (EU, 2009c) allows an ex-
ception to this rule that is available to 10 member states: Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland and Romania. They may allocate a limited number 
of free allowances to the electricity sector but only for a transi-
tional period.
29  Note also that the auctioning of the carbon emissions 
The “harmonization” of carbon pricing with the re-
newable energy targets is a promising additional 
EU intervention because it would be about address-
ing the concern that renewable energy policies are 
depressing the carbon price. Experts have indeed 
pointed out that carbon prices are low due to a lack of 
coordination between the renewable policy and the 
GHG emissions policy.30 The EU renewable target for 
2020 is indeed pushing low carbon energy in the mar-
ket, independently from the EU ETS, and the support 
schemes for renewables are much stronger incentives 
to invest in low-carbon technologies than the carbon 
price (Newbery, 2011; Traber and Kemfert, 2009; 
Morthorst, 2003). 
Third type of EU involvement: “level playing field” 
EU carbon market repository, platform, and authority 
for EU-ETS
With the EU-ETS, the EU succeeded in establishing 
a well-functioning carbon market that poses a cap on 
the total European carbon emissions (Ellerman et al., 
2010). A voluntary EU- auction platform has now 
also been created that provides a centralized auction-
ing process with standardized electronic contracts 
(EU, 2010b). Except Germany, Poland and the UK, 
all the other member states have opted for participat-
ing in the common platform (Delbeke, 2011), and in 
reaction to security concerns regarding the national 
registers, the EU will also offer an EU-register that 
member states can voluntarily subscribe to. 
An additional EU intervention to introduce a carbon 
market authority is promising because it would in-
troduce independent oversight (de Perthuis, 2011). 
will become a source of revenue for member states that can be 
used to finance low carbon policies in other sectors. 
30  The low carbon prices of today could also be explained 
by the recent economic downturn that reduced demand for en-
ergy; that would imply that the price may go up along with the 
recovery of the economy and especially after 2013 when a stricter 
cap will be applied (Mercuri and Clô, 2010).
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It could help to address the concern that the carbon 
price is not high enough.31 This authority could then 
have the power to assess the carbon price when the 
price would be considered inadequate to support the 
EU climate and energy policy.
Third type of EU involvement: “level playing field” 
EU carbon tax, at least for non-EU-ETS sectors
To guide the transition process, what matters is to 
have a carbon price that is a strong signal for invest-
ment, which can also come from a carbon tax. In fact, 
several economists have argued in favour of tax, also 
for EU-ETS sectors (Notre Europe, 2009). Such a tax 
could at least be considered as a promising EU inter-
vention for non EU-ETS sectors. The European Com-
mission has already taken a first step in this direction 
by proposing a new directive (EC, 2011j) to amend 
the 2003 directive on fossil fuel taxation (EU, 2003d). 
The proposal includes a minimum energy taxation 
based on CO2 content to tax GHG emissions to non-
ETS sectors, as a complement to the EU-ETS.
To sum up, Table 7 lists the most promising interven-
tions in the GHG policy area. 
3.2.4 Renewable energy
In what follows, we identify promising interventions 
to address the key renewable energy policy challenge 
in the 2050 context, i.e. to achieve renewable energy 
31  The UK government has for instance announced that it 
will introduce a carbon floor price for the power sector from 2013 
(HMT, 2011).
penetration levels that are much more ambitious than 
the current objectives. 
First type of EU involvement: “effort sharing” 
Binding renewable energy targets beyond 2020
This is a promising EU intervention because such 
binding targets have been a successful way to organize 
effort-sharing among member states to develop renew-
able energy technologies. The 2020 climate and energy 
package includes the target to use renewable energy 
sources for 20% of energy consumption encompassing 
the three main energy consuming sectors, i.e. electric-
ity, transport, and heating and cooling (EU, 2009e).32 
EU member states share the burden to achieve this 
overall target with binding national targets that have 
been set at EU level. Beyond this general target, there is 
a specific target for transportation: in each country at 
least 10% of transport fuel in 2020 must come from bio 
fuels or other renewable energy sources.33
Projections show that renewable energy in all mem-
ber states will grow faster than in the past years. EU 
countries are underway to reach their 2020 targets 
32  Targets for renewable energy were first defined at the 
EU level by the Directive 2001/77/EC (EU, 2001) with the aim to 
increase the share of RES to 21% in the electricity sector and to 
5.57% in transportation by 2010. But these targets were not bind-
ing and only a few member states were expected to achieve them 
by 2010. The failure to reach the agreed targets and the need for 
all member states to support renewable energy led to the new RES 
policy defined by the Renewable Energy Directive in 2009 (EU, 
2009e). 
33  The biofuels must be produced in a sustainable way, 
do not undermine food production or lead to deforestation or 
biodiversity loss (EU, 2009e).
Table 7 – Promising interventions in the GHG policy area
First type of EU involvement
“effort sharing”
Second type of EU involvement
“harmonization”
Third type of EU involvement
“level playing field”
Binding targets for
- Reduction of GHG emissions beyond 2020 
- More stringent and credible long term caps
Coherence requirement
- Carbon pricing with renewable energy 
targets
EU
- Carbon market repository, platform, and 
authority for EU-ETS
- Carbon tax, at least for non-EU-ETS sectors
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and almost half of the counties are planning to exceed 
their binding quota. If all member states implement 
the National Renewable Energy Action Plans they 
have recently submitted to the European Commis-
sion (EC, 2011d), the EU will exceed the 20% target in 
2020. EU energy consumption in 2020 is projected to 
be 95% of the 2005 level and energy from renewable 
energy source is expected to more than double from 
103 Mtoe in 2005 to 217 Mtoe in 2020. The electricity 
sector will account for 45% of this increase (especially 
wind power will significantly increase in importance, 
see Figure 4), heating 37% and transport 18%. 
Continuing the targets beyond 2020 is a promising in-
tervention because the costs of these technologies are 
not expected to reach competitive cost levels by 2020 
(EU, 2009e), with perhaps a few exceptions, while the 
transition towards a low carbon future heavily relies 
on the development of these technologies.
Second type of EU involvement: “harmonization”  
Market conformity requirements for national support 
schemes 
This is a promising EU intervention as member states 
will continue their policies to push renewable energy 
technologies into the market with national support 
schemes. This massive deployment of renewable en-
ergy will have a major impact on the electricity mar-
ket, also due to the fact that this market will be more 
and more European. 
As renewable energy technologies reach significant 
penetration levels, it will be important to integrate 
them into the market (Egenhofer and Jansen, 2006; 
Hiroux and Saguan, 2010). A harmonization of na-
tional support schemes for renewable energy could 
therefore include the requirement that these tech-
nologies participate in the wholesale and balancing 
electricity markets, so that at least part of their profits 
depend on their performance in these markets. This 
could be done by introducing “market conformity” 
requirements for these national support schemes.
Third type of EU involvement: “level playing field”  
EU support scheme 
This is a promising EU intervention because today most 
member states continue to focus on national renew-
able energy resources to achieve their 2020 target (EC, 
2011d), while the European Commission has estimated 
that up to 10 billion Euro could be saved if the existing 
cooperation mechanisms were used inside the EU.34 
An important exception is given to Sweden and Nor-
way as have recently announced to create a joint green 
certificate support scheme that will start in 2012. Note 
that the European Commission tried to introduce a 
tradable green certificate scheme, which has been un-
successful (Box 2), but a promising EU intervention 
would be to promote the voluntary participation of 
other member states to this type of member state co-
operation initiatives.
Third type of EU involvement: “level playing field” 
EU decision bodies of Mediterranean regulators and 
transmission companies; and EU trade platform for the 
Mediterranean
This is a promising EU intervention because the mas-
sive renewable energy sources just outside EU borders 
in the Mediterranean area are attractive to develop in 
34  Note that renewable energy directive established three 
different mechanisms by which member states can work together 
to develop renewable energy: with “statistical transfers” a member 
state can transfer a virtual quantity of renewable energy produced 
to another member state for target compliance purposes; a “joint 
project” is a project that is financed by several member states; and 
in “joint support schemes” two or more member states can join 
or coordinate their national support schemes (Klessmann et al. 
(2010) and Ahner (2011).
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the 2050 context.35 Creating a level playing field for 
cooperation with these non-EU countries would help 
progress these multilateral projects. 
The Mediterranean Solar Plan initiative can already 
be part of the solution. The EU launched this initiative 
in 2008 as one of the main projects of the Union for 
the Mediterranean and aims to develop 20 GW of re-
newable electricity capacity on the South Shore of the 
Mediterranean. Note that there is also an industry-led 
initiative called DESERTEC that has the ambition to 
35  Note however that only the EREC/Greenpeace vision 
relies on 60 GW of renewable energy to be developed outside the 
EU. The other visions in chapter 1 assume that the development 
will only take place inside the EU.
have concentrated solar power systems, photovoltaic 
systems and wind parks in the Sahara desert. A super 
grid would then connect this electricity production 
with consumers in European and African countries. 
EU-instruments that can help create a level playing 
field could include adapting EU-decision bodies, such 
as ACER, ENTSO-E and ERGEG to Mediterranean 
countries, or to create their Mediterranean counter-
parts. It could also be opportune to create a trading 
platform (e.g. “power exchange”) for the Mediterra-
nean (Glachant, 2011).
To sum up, Table 8 lists the most promising interven-
tions in the renewable energy policy area. 
Figure 4 – EU development of renewable energy in electricity
Source: EC, 2011d
Table 8 – Promising interventions in the renewable energy policy area
First type of EU involvement
“effort sharing”
Second type of EU involvement
“harmonization”
Third type of EU involvement
“level playing field”
Binding targets for
– Renewable energy beyond 2020 
Coherence requirement




- Decision bodies of Mediterranean regula-
tors and transmission companies
- Trade platform for the Mediterranean
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3.2.5 Energy infrastructure
In what follows, we identify promising interventions 
to address the key energy infrastructure challenge 
in the 2050 context, i.e. to ensure electricity grid ad-
equacy, which includes expanding the transmission 
grid across borders and also the smartening of trans-
mission and distribution grids.
First type of EU involvement: “effort sharing” 
Binding targets for electricity grid adequacy
This is a promising EU intervention because there is a 
history of not achieving indicative targets. The heads 
of government agreed at the Barcelona Council in 
2002 (EC, 2002b). Following these Barcelona targets, 
each member state should have had enough intercon-
nections to allow the import of at least 10% of its in-
stalled generation capacity by 2005. As indicated in 
red in Figure 5, several countries are not complying 
with these targets (indicated in red in Figure 5). 
In the 2050 context, binding targets could therefore 
ensure that every member state contributes to the 
development of a European grid. Ambitious binding 
targets would however need to be more sophisticated 
than the indicative Barcelona targets, for instance, 
because “import capacity” is difficult to define and 
measure.
Second type of EU involvement: “harmonization” 
Coherence requirements for the regulation of distribu-
tion and transmission grids
This is a promising EU intervention because smart grids 
need smart regulation (Bauknecht et al., 2007; Con-
nor and Mitchell, 2002; Meeus et al, 2010; Meeus and 
Saguan, 2011; Pérez-Arriaga, 2010). The conventional 
regulatory framework that has been successful at in-
centivizing grid companies to provide value for money 
grid services in the liberalization context, has its short-
comings in the current context where grid innovation is 
needed to allow Europe to achieve its ambitious energy 
policy targets. The main shortcomings of the conven-
tional regulatory framework are that grid companies 
Box 2. Unsuccessful proposal for an EU tradable green certificate scheme
The European Commission tried to introduce an EU 
tradable green certificate scheme because it was con-
sidered to be more in line with the integration of the 
EU electricity market (EC, 2005b). Member states did 
not want it for two main reasons. 
First, the alternative scheme, referred to as feed-in tar-
iffs/premiums, has proven to be successful in member 
states such as Denmark, Germany and Spain, where it 
supported an impressive growth of renewable energy 
generation. In the European context, it is considered 
by many to be the most efficient and effective mech-
anism, but there is no consensus on what would be 
the best EU-scheme, as some continue to argue that 
a certificate scheme would be successful at the EU 
level. For an overview of this debate, see for instance 
EC (2008f ), Fouquet and Johansson (2008), Frondel et 
al. (2010), Haas et al. (2011a and 2011b), IEA (2009b), 
Johansson and Turkenburg (2004), Klessmann et al. 
(2008), Re-Shaping (2011) and Verbruggen and Lau-
ber (2009).
Second, member states tend to prefer developing 
renewable resources with national support schemes, 
also at higher costs, because it allows them to capture 
local benefits such as green jobs and renewable tech-
nology industry development (del Río, 2005; Lund, 
2009; Wiser et al., 2007; Yin and Powers, 2010).
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have disincentives to innovate, and if they do innovate, 
they are confronted with grid users that have disincen-
tives to participate in the ongoing innovation. 
The harmonization of regulation of distribution and 
transmission grids could introduce coherence re-
quirements for the economic regulation of grids. 
Regulators could also be mandated to enable the tran-
sition (e.g. supporting the innovation an Europeani-
zation process) rather than being only responsible for 
improving the cost efficiency of grids. 
Note that smart markets are also an essential part of 
smart grids (CPI, 2011). There is still room to make 
better use of existing infrastructure by further inte-
grating electricity markets (ERGEG, 2010). Progress 
has been made by coupling markets at the day-ahead 
stage, but this has not yet been done on all borders.36 
36  Meeus (2011): “Cross-border capacities have been 
underpriced (Newbery and McDaniel, 2002; Neuhoff, 2003; 
Purchala et al., 2004), underused, and even frequently misused 
increasing price spreads instead of reducing them (Creti et al., 
Several borders are still closed one day before delivery 
so that intra-day and real time trade is only national 
in the countries concerned. This is an ongoing process 
(ERGEG, 2010), and the third package includes several 
opportunities to make further progress, for instance 
via the introduction of market codes and grid code. 
Third type of EU involvement: “level playing field”  
EU grid operator and planner 
This is a promising EU intervention because of two 
main reasons: 1// development of off-shore grids; 2// 
grid operation in a system with high penetration of 
variable renewable energy.
First reason is the development of off-shore grids. As 
illustrated in the case of Kriegers Flak (Box 3), tap-
2010; CRE, 2009; Frontier economics and Consentec, 2004; Kris-
tiansen, 2007; and Turvey, 2006), resulting in a lack of day-ahead 
hourly price convergence in Europe (Zachmann, 2008).” Further-
more, as evidenced by the experience on the Kontek Cable, it is 
not enough to implement market coupling, it has to be imple-
mented properly (Meeus, 2011). 
Figure 5 – Import capacity % installed generation capacity
Source: EC, 2007b
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ping into large scale renewable energy sources re-
quires coordination between national transmission 
companies, renewable energy developers, and tech-
nology providers, which could be partly internalized 
by an EU grid operator and planner. 
Second reason is grid operation in a system with high 
penetration of variable renewable energy. In the 2050 
context, coordination between TSOs will be increas-
ingly important for the operation of transmission 
grids that will be increasingly interdependent with 
increasing penetration of variable renewable energy. 
Note that in November 2006, 15 million people lost 
their electricity supply due to a lack of coordination 
between TSOs inside Germany. This has already led 
to a regional initiative called Coreso, which currently 
includes Belgium (Elia), France (RTE), part of Ger-
many (50Hertz), Italy (Terna), and the UK (National 
Grid) and the aim is to help European TSOs enhance 
the level of security of supply by giving them a com-
mon analysis of electricity flows complementary to 
their national analysis.
Promising, but institutionally difficult to establish, 
would be to have an EU Independent System Opera-
tor (EU-ISO) to operate and plan the European layer 
of grid.37 This EU-ISO could then develop EU plan-
ning tools to complement the EU planning proce-
dures that have been introduced in the third package 
(Ten Year Network Development Plan).38 An alter-
native could be to push the integration of grid opera-
tion and planning on a regional basis by supporting 
initiatives such as Coreso.
37 Friends of the Supergrid, which is a group of compa-
nies and organizations with a mutual interest in promoting the 
policy agenda for a European supergrid, have recently released a 
position paper where a possible policy and regulatory framework 
for the supergrid is presented, which includes: a single planner, 
a single grid code and a single European regulator. According to 
them, “ENTSO-E should also commence considering establish-
ing an ISO (Independent System Operator) among the TSOs of 
the North Sea region involved. This ISO would then enlarge its 
operational powers to involve the other TSOs while the Supergrid 
enlarges to the rest of the EU” (FOSG, 2010).
38 Note that these EU planning procedures are a bottom-
up approach to make a top-down plan. Indeed, these TYNDPs 
will be made by ENTSO-E in interaction with ACER, which are 
the EU-level decision bodies consisting of national transmission 
companies (TSOs) and regulators (NRAs) that have been created 
by the third package (EU, 2009f).
Box 3. Kriegers Flak
Kriegers Flak is a project that envisions the develop-
ment of three wind farms (for a total capacity of 1.6 GW), 
within German, Swedish and Danish waters, linked by a 
combined offshore grid connection which would also 
serve as an interconnection between the three coun-
tries (Energinet.dk, 2009). Three different TSOs are in-
volved (50-Hertz, Energinet.dk and Svenska Kraftnätt), 
as well as two market systems and two synchronous 
zones, posing a huge challenge regarding regulation 
of cross-border infrastructure. The feasibility study, 
published in a joint report of the three TSOs, concluded 
that the combined solution would generate positive 
net benefits compared to the separate solution.
Despite the recognition of benefits for the whole re-
gion and the priority attributed to this project from 
the Commission, the stakeholders in this project are 
subjected to national regulatory regimes that are not 
aligned. This can partly explain that the Swedish TSO 
left the project (note however that the technology 
used allows them to anyway step into the join solu-
tion at a later stage), the German TSO could not wait 
to pursue a separate solution for one of its wind farms, 
and the ambitions of the Danish TSO have been re-
duced as the Danish wind developer downscaled its 
project (Meeus and Saguan, 2011).
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Third type of EU involvement: “level playing field” 
EU infrastructure cost recovery instrument
This is a promising EU intervention because the 
existing cost recovery instruments are inadequate 
(Glachant and Kalfallah, 2011), they are: 1// national-
ly regulated tariffs and congestion revenues; 2// Inter-
TSO Compensation (ITC); 3// EU funding. 
First type of instrument is nationally regulatory tariffs 
and congestion revenues. Due to lumpiness of infra-
structure investments, the allocation of cross-border 
capacities will not generate enough revenue to pay for 
adequate grids (Pérez-Arriaga et al., 1995). Nationally 
regulated tariffs are appropriate tools for increasing 
projects of national interest, but they do not give in-
centives for efficient cross-border infrastructure pro-
jects. There is a fundamental problem that countries 
expected to expand their transmission grids do not 
necessarily benefit from it, while third countries can 
be important beneficiaries.
Second type of instrument is the Inter-TSO Compen-
sation (ITC). ITC mechanism defines the compensa-
tion rules between TSOs whose grid users cause tran-
sits and TSOs that incur costs due to transits (FSR, 
2005; Olmos, 2007). The compensation however only 
covers operation costs of existing infrastructure, such 
as losses, and the compensation is ex-post based on 
the actual usage of the infrastructure. In other words, 
it has not been designed to incentivize investment in 
new infrastructure.
Third type of instrument is EU funding. Examples of 
EU funding are the Trans-European Network pro-
gram (EU, 2003b; EU, 2004b; EU, 2009f), the Euro-
pean Economic Recovery Program (EC, 2008e) and 
the European Investment Bank. EU funding has been 
used to finance feasibility studies for project of com-
mon European interest and has also given limited 
support to the construction of these projects, but this 
support is marginal in comparison with the scale of 
the investments that are needed.
Promising, but institutionally difficult to implement, 
would be to have an EU regulated asset base paid 
by an EU tariff component. An alternative could be 
to implement an EU infrastructure investment cost 
compensation scheme. Contrary to the inter-TSO 
compensation mechanism, this investment cost com-
pensation scheme would however need to be an ex-
ante scheme because it is about incentivizing new 
infrastructure. The experience with the inter-TSO 
scheme also suggests that this investment cost com-
pensation scheme will need to be set at the EU level 
because as it is too difficult for European stakeholders 
to find a consensus among them.
Third type of EU involvement:  
“level playing field”  
EU smart grid technology standards
This is a promising EU intervention to ensure interop-
erability in the electricity grid. The EU already started 
playing a key role in setting standards for smart grid 
technologies. In line with the Directive 2004/22/EC 
(EU, 2004c) and the Directive 2006/32/EC (EU, 2006c), 
the Commission for instance issued a mandate to the 
European Standardization Organizations (ESOs) in 
2009 to define EU standards for smart utility meters. 
In March 2011, the Commission issued an additional 
mandate to ESOs to develop standards to facilitate the 
implementation of smart grid (EC, 2009c).
To sum up, Table 9 lists the most promising inter-
ventions in the energy infrastructure area. Note that 
the announced infrastructure package can already be 
part of the solution. The intention is to create regional 
cooperation platforms, following the example of the 
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Baltic Energy Interconnection Plan and the North 
Seas Countries Offshore Grid Initiative; better and 
faster permit granting procedures; guidelines or a leg-
islative proposal to address cost allocation for cross-
borders projects (EC, 2010c).
3.2.6 Internal energy market
In what follows, we identify promising interventions 
to address the key energy market challenge in the 
2050 context, i.e. to ensure electricity supply security, 
which includes making sure that there are timely in-
vestments, especially concerning system flexibility.
First, second and third type of EU involvement  
Creation of an internal balancing market with binding 
targets for reservation of balancing services, harmo-
nization of national balancing markets, and an EU 
balancing market codes
This is a promising EU intervention because of three 
main reasons: 1// system flexibility is addressed in 
balancing markets; 2// today’s balancing markets are 
mainly national; 3// visions assume an internal bal-
ancing market.
First reason is that system flexibility is addressed in 
balancing markets. The experience in countries with 
a large penetration of renewable energy technologies 
is indeed increasingly evidencing that the reliability of 
the system will depend on having enough flexibility to 
balance wind and solar power (IEA, 2011; Gottstein, 
2011; Pérez-Arriaga, 2011). The problem of system 
flexibility is addressed in balancing markets in which 
TSOs are the single buyers of balancing services. TSOs 
are also responsible for allocating the costs of these ser-
vices to the parties that are responsible for the system 
imbalances, and for reserving capacity to ensure the 
availability of balancing services (Frunt, 2011; Van-
dezande et al., 2010; Vandezande, 2011).
Second reason is that today’s balancing markets are 
mainly national. These markets are organized very 
differently in most countries, including: how the ser-
vices are defined, the contractual arrangements, time 
of procurement, and the allocation of costs.39 This was 
already a concern from the internal market point of 
view (EC, 2007b), but the new element is that the re-
liability of the system will now also increasingly de-
pend on the functioning of balancing markets and 
the availability of balancing services. 
Third reason is that the 2050 visions assume an inter-
nal balancing market. Indeed, the visions in chapter 
1 have in common that they project ambitious grid 
expansions across borders, which reduces the need 
for back-up capacity.
A first step towards an internal balancing market 
39  Exceptions include Nordic countries that have an inte-
grated balancing market. Other exceptions are arrangements that 
are specific to the synchronous system a country belongs to, such 
as the UCTE solidarity mechanism for dealing with the first reac-
tion to a system disturbances (Tractebel Engineering and Katho-
lieke Universiteit Leuven, 2009).
Table 9 – Promising interventions in the energy infrastructure policy area 
First type of EU involvement
“effort sharing”
Second type of EU involvement
“harmonization”
Third type of EU involvement
“level playing field”
Binding targets for
- Electricity grid adequacy
Coherence requirements for
- Regulation of grids
EU 
- Grid operator and planner
- Infrastructure cost recovery instrument
- Smart grid technology standards
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could be regional balancing markets, which has been 
a relatively successful approach to integrate wholesale 
markets (Everis and Mercados, 2010). The EU in-
volvement in balancing markets could lead eventually 
to EU balancing market codes to create a level play-
ing field by defining EU-balancing services. In such 
an internal balancing market, the reservation costs 
of these services will also need to be shared, which 
could be organized as a burden sharing with binding 
national reservation targets.
Second type of EU involvement: “harmonization” 
Harmonization of security of  
electricity supply mechanisms
This is a promising intervention to avoid that these 
mechanisms work against the decarbonisation process. 
The vision of the liberalization process has been that 
market opening40 and the creation of an internal whole-
sale market leads to timely investments, but member 
states have been given a lot of freedom in the market by 
the security of supply directive (EU, 2006b).41 Regulators 
have already expressed concerns that these measures are 
40  The EU involvement in the energy market policy area 
started in 1985 with the objective of creating an EU internal 
market by 1992. The opening of the energy sector was achieved 
much later than in other sectors and the final step was to require 
member states to open their household markets by July 2007 (EU, 
2003c).
41  The intervention can be explicit or implicit. Explicit 
means that there is a generation capacity mechanism (e.g. capac-
ity markets or capacity payments), which is for instance the case 
in Ireland, Italy, Spain and Greece. Implicit interventions are for 
instance long-term contracting of energy and/or reserves by the 
regulator or the system operator, which is for instance the case 
with “strategic reserves” in the Nordic countries.
still mainly national in scope and therefore possible ex-
ternal effects on neighbouring countries and markets 
are often not considered (CEER, 2009). 
There is also an on going debate on whether or not 
such interventions are necessary, and on what the best 
way to intervene is (Box 5). Fact is, that the conven-
tional long-term security of supply mechanisms used 
to intervene have been designed to generate addition-
al revenue for power plants that can be available dur-
ing peak hours when the reliability of the system is 
at stake, while the new challenge in the 2050 context 
is system flexibility. Furthermore, these conventional 
mechanisms can also extend the lifetime of high car-
bon power plants and, if not properly designed, they 
also tend to favour generation side solutions.
The few experiences with long term security of sup-
ply mechanisms that also foster demand side partici-
pation, have been positive (Gottstein and Schwartz, 
2010). Harmonization could therefore, for instance, 
include the requirement that demand resources be 
able to participate in these mechanisms on equal 
footing with generation.
To sum up, Table 10 lists the most promising inter-
ventions in the energy infrastructure area. The recent 
European Council decision can already be part of the 
solution (EC, 2011f): “The internal market should be 
completed by 2014 so as to allow gas and electricity 
to flow freely. This requires in particular that in coop-
eration with ACER national regulators and transmis-
sion system operators step up their work on market 
Table 10 – Promising interventions in the internal energy market policy area 
First type of EU involvement
“effort sharing”
Second type of EU involvement
“harmonization”
Third type of EU involvement
“level playing field”
Binding targets for 
– Reservation of balancing services
Harmonization of
– Balancing markets
– Security of electricity supply mechanisms
EU 
– Balancing market codes
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coupling and guidelines on network codes applicable 
across European networks.”
3.2.7 Technology innovation and R&D
Improving currently known technologies and devel-
oping new ones is a crucial energy and climate ob-
jective. Several studies have argued that an ambitious 
clean energy R&D program is both effective and ef-
ficient, but that it would require an increase of R&D 
expenditures to several times the recent levels (Bo-
setti et. Al, 2009; EC, 2009a; IEA, 2010).
Third  type of EU involvement: “level playing field 
Complement the Strategic Energy Technology Plan 
(SET-Plan). 
The policy area of technology innovation and R&D 
has been covered in the previous THINK report on 
“Public support for the financing of RD&D activities 
Box 5. Long-term security of supply mechanisms
Battle and Rodilla (2010): “Since the very beginning 
of the power systems reform process, one of the key 
questions posed has been whether the market, of its 
own accord, is able to provide satisfactory security of 
supply at the power generation level, see for instance 
Perez-Arriaga (2001), Stoft (2002), Hogan (2005), 
Joskow (2007) or Finon and Pignon (2008), or if some 
additional regulatory mechanism needs to be intro-
duced, and in the latter case, which is the most suit-
able approach to tackle the problem. The previous 
authors have contributed to this debate by claiming 
that, in a number of different contexts, and for a va-
riety of reasons, there is a market failure. This market 
failure poses the regulatory need to provide the incen-
tives the market is not providing so as to ensure an ef-
ficient security of supply level. This translates in prac-
tice into providing generators with an extra income 
and/or hedge instruments in exchange for a product 
(e.g. installed capacity or long-term energy contracts) 
aimed to enhance security of supply.”
In the 2050 context, the main concern is policy un-
certainty. Only part of the investment will respond 
to market prices, and this part is very unsure. It is 
for instance unclear how strong and fast other sec-
tors will electrify (demand side uncertainty) or low 
carbon technologies will be pushed (supply side 
uncertainty). As discussed in chapter 2, the UK and 
France have recently started a market reform pro-
cess motivated by increasing electricity supply se-
curity concerns.
Battle and Rodilla (2010) observe a certain conver-
gence in long-term security of supply mechanisms 
design criteria worldwide, but conclude that we 
are still far from obtaining a definite consensus on 
the subject. They find that the reason is that each 
market’s particularities make it difficult to export 
a successful design. Joskow (2008) reports about 
the deficiencies of the original capacity payment 
mechanisms that have been used in the US and 
argues in favour of a forward capacity obligation 
in combination with a centralized auction for ca-
pacity. Similarly designed capacity markets are 
discussed and proposed, for instance in Cramton 
and Stoft (2008) and Finon and Pignon (2008). Bat-
tle and Pérez-Arriaga (2008) also reviewed the main 
criteria to be taken into consideration in the design 
of a regulatory mechanism of this nature.
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in new clean energy technologies” (THINK, 2011a). 
This THINK report identified the Strategic Energy 
Technology Plan (SET-Plan) as the state-of-the-art 
instrument used at the EU level to prioritize innova-
tion projects in low carbon technologies (EC, 2009a). 
The report concluded that this EU instrument could 
be improved to ensure that public support will go 
to a balanced portfolio of innovation projects. Cur-
rently, the SET-Plan is industry focused and bottom 
up, which needs to be complemented by a more top 
down approach that can prioritize projects proposed 
by different industries and also improves the balance 
between early innovation to create new options and 
later stage innovation to push the most promising op-
tions into market (i.e. third type of EU involvement).
3.3 The need for an integrated policy 
package
The need for an integrated policy package comes 
from the many interactions between the six energy 
policy areas that we have discussed individually in the 
previous sections. It also comes from wider interac-
tions between these energy policy areas with other 
EU policy domains in the 2050 context.
3.3.1 The interactions between the six energy 
policy areas
The DG Climate roadmap (EC, 2011a) indicates that 
by achieving the energy efficiency target in 2020, 
the GHG emission reduction target would be overa-
chieved. It is just one of many examples of how energy 
policy areas interact. These interactions as well as the 
resulting need to make an integrated policy package 
have also been one of reasons to call for an integrated 
climate and energy policy package for 2020 (Capros 
et al., 2008). 
Figure 6 illustrates these interactions, i.e. they include 
technology innovation that is a precondition for most 
of the challenges in the other areas, the interaction 
between GHG emission targets and RES targets, en-
Figure 6 – Energy policy interactions
http://think.eui.eu32
Final Report - June 2011
ergy savings that have implications for the size of the 
internal energy market and infrastructure, renewable 
energy development that will drive the need for elec-
tricity transmission grid expansion and distribution 
grid smartening, etc.
In the 2050 context, the above interactions are ex-
tremely important, and together with the European 
ambitions, the importance of these interactions is 
also increasing. There are also new interactions to 
consider, including 1// the possible impact of the de-
carbonisation of the transport and heating and cool-
ing sectors on the electricity load profile, and 2// the 
likely impact of the decarbonisation policies on the 
role of natural gas infrastructure and the natural gas 
market.
First is the impact of the decarbonisation of the trans-
port and heating and cooling sectors on the electricity 
load profile. In the 2050 context, the size of the elec-
tricity system will depend on how quick and to what 
extent there will be a high level of electrification in 
the transport and heating and cooling sectors. This is 
a challenge, but also an opportunity for the electric-
ity sector (Ekman, 2011; Lund and Kempton, 2008; 
Kempton and Tomić, 2005). For instance, a massive 
penetration of electric vehicles would be a challenge 
because it would significantly change the load curve, 
while electric vehicles could also help to manage the 
variable output of renewable energy sources. It is 
therefore important to ensure consistency between 
the initiatives proposed in the transport roadmap and 
what should be included in the energy roadmap. It 
could therefore be opportune to have an integrated 
“energy and transport” policy package.
Second is the impact of the decarbonisation policies 
on the role of natural gas infrastructure and the natu-
ral gas market. Gas could be the bridging fuel of the 
first part of the 21st century, while R&D work to find 
efficient and effective solutions to climate change. 
Gas, indeed, is an option immediately available to 
reduce GHG emissions, by displacing coal and oil in 
power generation and other sectors until renewables 
Figure 7 – Interactions of energy policy with other EU policy domains
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can compete on a large scale and CCS has passed its 
test period and is commercially viable. Most decar-
bonisation pathways assume a decreasing gas de-
mand, but gas continues to play a key role in the bal-
ancing of the energy system. Note also that even if gas 
might no longer be the fuel of choice, it could become 
the fuel of consequence anyway in case some other 
options do not materialise in the timeframe planned 
(e.g. the recent events with nuclear or the growing 
cost of subsidizing solar). Moreover, gas could be a 
no-regret option. Firstly, CCGTs have a considerably 
lower capital costs compared to coal, nuclear and re-
newables. Secondly, gas power plants can provide the 
system flexibility that is needed to deal with massive 
penetration of variable renewable energy. However, 
there is uncertainty regarding the role of natural gas, 
which may lead to underinvestment both inside and 
outside the EU, which may also lead to security of 
supply issues (SECURE, 2010).42 Even though it is out 
of the scope of this report, it is important to revisit 
the role of the EU regarding natural gas in the 2050 
context. 
3.3.2 Interactions of energy policy with other 
EU policy domains
Figure 7 illustrates some of the many interactions of 
energy policies with other EU policy domains in the 
2050 context. The “other EU policy domains” in the 
illustration follow the terminology used by the EU 
when dividing policy into domains. 
The above EU policy domains can be grouped into 
1// international issues (regional policy and external 
42  Furthermore, despite the possibility of no longer being 
the fuel of choice, natural gas can become the fuel of consequence 
anyway in case some other options do not materialize in the time-
frame planned (e.g. the recent events with nuclear). For instance, 
after the recent events in Japan, Germany decided to quit the op-
tion of using nuclear as a bridging technology which might lead 
to a larger use of natural gas than the one predicted.
relations); 2// economic issues (employment and so-
cial affairs, economic and monetary affairs, research 
and innovation, external trade); 3// and social issues 
(public health and human rights). Below we highlight 
a few of these interactions because addressing these 
issues will be crucial to gain public support for the 
transition towards a low carbon energy system.
First are international issues. Without a coordinated 
global action, the EU policy alone will not avoid cli-
mate change by 2050 and EU should keep incentiviz-
ing other countries to develop low carbon energy pol-
icies. The EU ETS can play an important role. First, as 
the largest carbon price scheme, it set an important 
example that could be followed; second it could be 
extended to non-EU countries that are interested to 
join it.43 Furthermore, the EU also needs to pursue its 
transition to a low carbon economy in a cooperative 
partnership with its main fossil fuel suppliers, espe-
cially gas suppliers (SECURE, 2010). Finally, the EU 
has also made an effort to lift people out of poverty, 
which includes the increase of people’s access to en-
ergy. Universal access can go hand in hand with fight-
ing climate change, but only if sustainable growth is 
promoted based on the development of a sustainable 
energy system (EC, 2010d). 
Second are economic issues. The transition to a low-
carbon economy for 2050 requires massive invest-
ments. As highlighted by the DG Climate Roadmap, 
this could spur economic growth in the manufacturing 
sectors and environmental services in Europe with po-
tentially opportunities of new business and jobs (EC, 
2011a). There is however also a concern that low car-
bon energy policies could also lead to the loss of com-
petitiveness of energy-intensive industrial activities. 
This is something that should be considered by the 
EU when designing its energy policy, since there is the 
43  The EU ETS is already extended to non-member states: 
Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein joined the scheme in 2007.
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need to promote measures that help these industries 
to mitigate the transition. This so-called carbon leak-
age issue has to be addressed in a cooperative approach 
with other major economic blocks using for instance 
sector approaches. Another important aspect to con-
sider is the impact that the climate policy will have on 
public budgets of the member states. THINK has also 
been asked by DG Energy to make a report on the im-
pact of climate and energy policies on member state 
budgets. This report will be finalized by the end of May 
2011, together with this report.
Third are social issues. Low carbon energy policies 
will have an impact on the distribution of wealth be-
cause it includes radical changes within the economy 
and for the society in general and comprehends a sig-
nificant cost for the society (at least in the short-term). 
The EU recognized fuel poverty as a relevant issue in 
the third energy market liberalisation package,44 but 
44  From the Directive 2009/72/EC for the internal market 
in electricity and the Directive 2009/73/EC for the internal mar-
ket in natural gas (EU, 2009f): “Member States should ensure the 
necessary energy supply for vulnerable customers”.
it will also be important to anticipate possible redis-
tribution effects; for instance, when designing energy 
efficiency and renewable energy support schemes it 
is important to avoid or remedy that poor people pay 
for the support via higher grid tariffs, but do not ben-
efit from it as they are not able to afford the upfront 
investment that is anyway required (so-called “re-
verse Robin-hood effect”). Furthermore, it is funda-
mental that people are aware of the importance of low 
carbon energy policies. For instance, because many 
new infrastructures will be needed in the next future 
and local resistance to these projects could constitute 
a serious barrier to their achievement (Wüstenhagena 
et al, 2007; Zoellner et al., 2008; Create Acceptance, 
2007), but also because all EU citizens are called to 
change their behaviour as energy users and this will 
inevitably enter into their everyday life. 
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Recommendations for the DG Energy 
roadmap
Track progress
The path towards 2050 is long and full of uncertain-
ties with strong and complex interactions. It will 
therefore be crucial to track progress during the tran-
sition to allow for many policy adaptations, with 2030 
and 2040 as important milestones. This implies close 
monitorization of investments and choices made by 
private actors, as well as policy implementation by 
policy makers, as several pioneering member states 
already started doing at the national level.
Ten priority EU-interventions to add val-
ue to member states’ first steps on the 
road towards 2050
Energy efficiency
1) Make energy saving targets binding. We cannot 
afford not reaching our energy savings ambitions, 
and locking ourselves into energy inefficient tech-
nologies and assets, such as energy consuming 
buildings and transport infrastructures.
2) Mobilize cities towards a low carbon future. It 
implies going beyond the Covenant of Mayors, 
which is a successful voluntary initiative that 
should be complemented by an organized map-
ping of cities with an EU reporting methodology 
to allow good practices to be identified and spread.
Greenhouse gas emissions
3) Strengthen the carbon price signal. This could 
be done with a more ambitious emission reduc-
tion targets and credible longer term cap for the 
EU-ETS and/or the introduction of a carbon tax.
Renewable energy
4) Integrate renewable energy technologies into 
the market. Renewable energy technologies need 
to be pushed into the market as long as necessary, 
but they should also be integrated into the market, 
for instance, by requiring them to participate in 
wholesale and balancing electricity markets.
5) Create a level playing field for renewable en-
ergy cooperation with non-EU countries. This 
implies adapting EU-instruments, such as ACER, 
ERGEG, ENTSO-E to Mediterranean countries, 
or to create their Mediterranean counterparts. 
Energy infrastructure
6) Harmonize the regulation of distribution and 
transmission grids. Smart grids need smart regu-
lation. Harmonization of the economic regulation 
of distribution and transmission grids is needed 
to ensure that grid regulation will not hamper the 
smartening of grids. 
7) Design an EU infrastructure cost recovery in-
strument. The existing cost recovery instruments 
for infrastructure are inadequate to support the 
European grid expansion that will enable the tran-
sition towards a low carbon energy system.
Internal energy market
8) Create an internal balancing market. Market inte-
gration has to be completed and extended to the real 
time. System flexibility is crucial to keep the lights 
on in a low carbon electricity system. It requires the 
creation of an internal balancing market with re-
gional balancing markets as a possible intermediate 
step. This implies to organize a burden sharing for 
the reservation costs of balancing services.
9) Harmonize electricity supply security mecha-
nisms. These mechanisms can be justified by na-
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tional system specificities, but they should at least 
comply with minimum requirements to avoid that 
they work against the decarbonisation process. 
Technology innovation and R&D
10) Complement the Strategic Energy Technology 
Plan (SET-Plan). The SET-Plan is industry focused 
and bottom up, which should be complemented by a 
more top down approach that can prioritize projects 
proposed by different industries and that improves 
the balance between early innovation to create new 
options and later stage innovation to push the most 
promising options into the market.
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Annexes
Annex 1: Sector-specific objectives and GHG emissions reductions
Table A.1 – Sector-specific objectives and GHG emission reductions within the DG Climate Roadmap
Sector GHG emissions’ reduction Sector-specific objectives
Power 93 to 99%
Almost fully decarbonised by 2050
Electricity might partially replace fossil fuels in transport and heating; however, 
electricity demand continues to increase at historic growth rates, due to continuous 
improvements in efficiency
The share of low-carbon technologies is estimated to increase from 45% today to 
around 60% in 2020, to between 75 and 80% by 2030, and nearly 100% in 2050
Transport 54 to 67%
Technological innovation can help in the transition to a more efficient and sustain-
able energy system, through:
1 increase of vehicle efficiency (new engines, material and design)
2 cleaner energy use (new fuels and propulsion systems)
3 better use of networks and safer and more secure operation (ICT)
Residential and 
services 88 to 91%
This sector provides low-cost and short-term opportunities to reduce emissions 
(mainly through the improvement of energy performance of buildings)
The refurbishment of the existing building stock is the greatest challenge within the 
sector
Industry 83 to 87% The deployment of carbon capture and storage technologies at a larger scale might be necessary after 2035 
Agriculture 42 to 49% Improved agricultural and forestry practices can increase the capacity of the sector to preserve and sequester carbon in soils and forests
Other 70 to 78% -
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Annex 2: DG Move transport roadmap
Table A.2 – Highlights of what needs to be done according to this roadmap
An efficient and integrated mobility system
1. A single European transport area
A true internal market for rail services; Completion of the single European sky; Capacity and quality of airports; A maritime “Blue Belt” and 
market access to ports; A suitable framework for inland navigation; Road freight; Multimodal transport of goods: e-Freight
2. Promoting quality jobs and working conditions
Social code for mobile road transport workers; A social agenda for maritime transport; A socially responsible aviation sector; An evaluation of 
the EU approach to jobs and working conditions across transport modes
3. Secure transport
Cargo security; High levels of passenger security with minimum hassle; Land transport security; “End-to-end” security
4. Acting on transport safety: saving thousands of lives
Towards a “zero-vision” on road safety; A European strategy for civil aviation safety; Safer shipping; Rail safety; Transport of dangerous goods
5. Service quality and reliability
Passenger’s rights; Seamless door-to-door mobility; Mobility continuity plans
Innovating for the future: technology and behaviour
1. A European Transport Research and Innovation policy
A technology roadmap; An innovation and deployment strategy; A regulatory framework for innovative transport
2. Promoting more sustainable behaviour 
Travel information; Vehicle labelling for CO
2
 emissions and fuel efficiency; Carbon footprint calculators; Eco-driving and speed limits
3. Integrated urban mobility
Urban mobility plans; An EU framework for urban road user charging; A strategy for near “zero-emission urban logistics”2030
Modern infrastructure and smart funding
1. Transport infrastructure: territorial cohesion and economic growth
A core network of strategic European infrastructure – A European mobility network; Multimodal freight corridors for sustainable transport 
networks; Ex-ante project evaluation criteria
2. A coherent funding framework
A new funding framework for transport infrastructure; Private sector engagement
3. Getting prices right and avoiding distortions
Smart pricing and taxation
The external dimension
Transport in the World: the external dimension
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Annex 3: Assumed fuel prices
Table A.2 – Assumptions regarding fuel prices from the different stakeholders’ visions (US$ 2008)
EGAF




















2009 59 2008 97.2 2010 71.9 2008 97 2009 59 2015 110.6
2015 87 2020 100 2020 88.4 2020 - 2015 87 2020 130
2030 115 2030 115 2030 105.9 2030 90 2030 115 2030 150
2040 115 2040 - 2040 116.2 2040 - 2040 115 2040 150







2010 7.9 2008 10.3 2010 8.12 2008 10.9 2009 9.39 2010 11.0
2015 7.9 2020 12.1 2020 10.7 2020 - 2015 11.1 2020 16.6
2030 7.9 2030 14.2 2030 13.2 2030 11.6 2030 15.0 2030 19.3
2040 7.9 2040 - 2040 14.96 2040 - 2040 15.0 2040 22









) 2009 70 2010 120.6 2010 95.5 2008 121 2009 70 2010 120.6
2015 91 2020 104.2 2020 129.8 2020 - 2015 91 2020 135.4
2030 109 2030 109.0 2030 141.8 2030 65 2030 109 2030 142.7
2040 109 2040 - 2040 141.2 2040 - 2040 109 2040 160
2050 109 2050 - 2050 146.1 2050 58 2050 109 2050 172.3
*For the high gas price scenario, the gas prices are the same than in ECF
Annex 4: List of Abbreviations
CCTS Carbon capture transport and storage
DG Director General
ECCP European Climate Change Programme
ECF European Climate Foundation 
EGAF European Gas Advocacy Forum
EREC European Renewable Energy Council
EU European Union
EU ETS European Union Emission Trading Scheme
GHG Greenhouse gas
IEA International Energy Agency
ISO Independent system operator
RES Renewable energy sources
SET-Plan Strategic Energy Technology Plan
TSO Transmission system operators
TYNDP Ten Year Network Development Plan
WEO World Energy Outlook
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Annex 5: industrial council meeting – 
summary of the discussion on the ro-
bustness of the preliminary project re-
sults in March
Responsible: Serge GALANT, Technofi 
Submission date: March 2011
The question to be answered
What role for the EU in the design and implementa-
tion of 2050 low carbon energy policies?
The tentative answer
– There are several options available for the EU, 
which may cover standardizing technologies, regulat-
ing markets, harmonizing coordination between net-
work operators, pricing network tariffs to account for 
their progressive reengineering, enforcing existing or 
future Directives more stringently, etc…
– At any rate, there is a prerequisite for future low 
carbon energy policies: all member states will have 
to go for more interdependence in order to send and 
reach the future 2050 orientations. 
Clarity improvements proposed for the report 
next version
– Indicate right up front the role of the THINK report 
at EC level, given an already complex background in 
the energy sector (FP7, FP8, FP9…), the role of the 
SET Plan. In other words, the report ambition should 
be properly tuned.
– Emphasize, within a dedicated section, the para-
doxical situation where Europe will be more and more
– there are drivers for more interdependence (for 
instance TSOs have initiated CORESO and TSC 
for regional coordination of operations)
– there are drivers for more fragmentation (for 
instance regional renewable policies)
– and attempt to list the drivers that support ei-
ther one of the opposite attitudes.
– Recall, in the introductory section the changes of 
mind set, which are needed to address 2050 orienta-
tions and 2030 targets45.
– The three pillars of European policy must be re-
visited, thanks to changes in mind set. For instance, 
which are the right market designs that lead to the 
proper capacity investment able to support an im-
proved security of supply?
– Detail the future expected market failures which 
will require public support: this will help in getting 
public acceptance on such public support schemes, 
both as energy consumers and energy savers.
– The harmonizing orientation should be further 
digged into, providing new clues beyond what has 
been or is being done.
– Be careful about the interpretation of IEA road-
maps in the future report. They do not recommend 
what the EU role could or should be in moving for-
ward according to 2050 orientations. Rather, they 
provide quantitative scenarios to position EU within 
a world perspective, leaving EU players the only ones 
responsible for the choice of 2050 orientations and 
the action plan implementation to move forward ac-
cording to such orientations.
Completeness improvements proposed for the 
report next version
45  See for instance the work performed in France on 2050 
targets 
– Feuille de route « Electricité photovoltaïque», Version finale, 
Juin 2010
– Feuille de route « Solaire Thermodynamique», Version finale, 
Juin 2010
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– Beyond policy marking is policy implementation. 
One can lean from the 2020 targets, analyzing pos-
sible shifts in implementation, which are allowed by 
the Treaty. For instance, new policies could be imple-
mented by a subset of pioneer players like in the re-
cent European patent example.
– When addressing the challenges that underpin the 
choice of policy orientations, it is needed to detail
– challenge areas where there is consensus 
(which does not mean that everybody is right!)
– challenge areas where there is dissent (and 
where there is a higher probability of innova-
tive ideas to be implemented)
– When addressing the energy sectors, the full cov-
erage of all activities must be provided (electricity, 
residential, tertiary, industry, transport)
– Going toward less and less carbon releases will cost 
more and more, unless interdependences are more and 
more implemented. Higher investment costs might 
mean higher difficulties in raising the interest of inves-
tors (including non energy investors). This will require 
stable and robust returns on investments, which are 
easier for regulated monopoly players (network opera-
tors), than for free market players which are undergo-
ing strong competition at generation and retail level. 
Only innovative business models will help, but with 
rate of returns that can be hampered by the inherent 
more risky position of the innovative business players.
– Underline the still existing risks of CCTS (where T 
stands for transport): the performance of CCTS can-
not be taken for granted on the long term and requires 
long term knowledge acquisition to ascertain the final 
CO2 capture performance (technical and economi-
cal). As a matter of fact, the coupling of CCTS with 
industrial activities must be underlined as a possible 
route which has not been to be studied so far.
- Complete the good lessons learnt from policy im-
plementation in the mentioned targeted countries 
(France, Germany, UK) for 2020 and beyond policies. 
For instance, in the UK:
– legislative budget to make the transition hap-
pen,
– annual report to the Parliament with indica-
tions able to pinpoint critical under or over 
achievement,
– investment monitoring to make sure that the 
financial market can respond to the investment 
needs
– Implement a section on the gas market and gas 
vector impacts onto the 2050 policy orientations, in 
view of the recent Japanese accident that could lead 
to a shift back to more carbonated fuels.
– In the major Member States where energy policy 
shifts were implemented in the past, a strong connec-
tion between energy policy and industrial policy was 
the basis for arbitrations between several optional 
routes. One of the roles of the EU would be to do the 
same, especially for better addressing the challenges 
of interdependence (for instance new technologies 
for electric transmission networks).
Coherence improvements proposed for the re-
port next version
– Whereas final prices are quoted as a critical param-
eter to support or to inhibit the transition, much less 
is said about the impact of CO2 pricing on the tenta-
tive routes. Please expand on this parameter too.
– There is no clear assumption about the cross re-
lationships between a strong/weak Euro and 2050 
policy choices. What is the optimal Euro profile to 
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support the future investments to implement the 
transition according to the 2050 orientations?
– As a consequence, can the EU be also in a posi-
tion to structure capital markets, which would ease 
the above investments making them more attractive 
than the ones addressing similar low carbon issues in 
the USA, China or India?
– Can a section be introduced to address the impacts 
of the possible routes towards 2050 on trade within 
and outside EU27?
– Does it make sense to address the robustness of 
this policy recommendation using a “what/if ” ap-
proach in a final section?
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Annex 6: comments by project advisors 
on preliminary version of the report in 
April
Project Advisor: Pantelis CAPROS, 
Professor at NTUA – E3MLab/ICCS 
Submission date: April 2011 
The report is a very good effort to make a synthesis 
on a difficult topic. Good ideas about the EU role. Re-
marks for improvement:
List of stakeholders visions
Probably there is now time to include the Roadmap 
2050 published recently by DG CLIMA. This would 
be important.
Levels of EU involvement
The report proposes three roles for the EU: setting 
targets, harmonization regarding measures to be cho-
sen by MS, ensuring level playing field by introducing 
EU-wide instrument. 
These are valid roles for the EU, but there should be 
probably two additional roles: a) making effective the 
building of common infrastructure which will fa-
cilitate sharing of resources to be employed towards 
decarbonisation (e.g. highway and other interconnec-
tions for sharing RES, common balancing for electric-
ity at multiple countries level, common balancing for 
gas and arrangements to ensure flexibility in gas use 
and affordability as gas has a major reliability role to 
play in the future structure of power generation, com-
mon CO2 transport system for sharing storage areas, 
etc.); b) setting common standards for new technolo-
gies (appliances, equipment, car battery recharging 
infrastructure, etc.) in order to maximize interop-
erability in the EU and increase efficiency through 
economies of scale in technology manufacturing at 
the EU level.
Probably the second role could be added to harmo-
nization role. But the first role should be shown sepa-
rately as it is important and cannot be categorized in 
the other roles.
Although the report mentions an EU-wide instru-
ment, such an instrument is not identified and is not 
discussed further.
Energy efficiency: challenge of achieving ambi-
tious energy savings and setting of binding na-
tional targets
There is agreement on the great contribution of en-
ergy efficiency improvement in the emission cuts. 
For this purpose, the European Union has set up a 
long series of Directives and Regulations. The main 
problem however is the weakness of endorsement 
mechanisms in the European legislation, especially in 
the domain of Buildings, Energy Service Companies 
and obligations of energy utilities to show energy sav-
ing performance at the level of their customers. The 
enforcement mechanisms have to be concrete, direct, 
flexible and efficient, so as to need limited recourse to 
European Court procedures. Introducing binding na-
tional targets may help but the usual approach of set-
ting binding targets without true (and market-based) 
enforcement mechanisms is very inefficient. It would 
be better to have binding targets specifically for the 
buildings sector and market-based mechanisms for 
ESCOs and energy utility obligations. An example is 
the white certificate system which could become the 
equivalent of ETS for the energy efficiency domain.
Based on this, I recommend that the report puts em-
phasis on endorsement mechanisms and the estab-
lishment of market-based instruments for delivering 
the energy efficiency objectives, rather than on the 
setting of (vague) national binding targets. By the 
way, imposing the 20% as binding target for 2020 is 
a controversial issue, because it would be very ambi-
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tious to achieve and monitoring would be question-
able. Many of the regulations for energy efficiency are 
still pending.
Remarks for the EURELECTRIC study
In the main scenario, the assumption taken for CCS is 
that it would be mature by 2025 (not 2030 as stated) 
but technology learning curve will continue after that 
date.
In this study, the total cost of decarbonisation is simi-
lar to the reference scenario (which is strong in poli-
cies such as ETS but does not deliver the decarboni-
sation). Costs are significantly higher than a baseline 
(business as usual). The report states lower costs rela-
tive to a baseline, which is not correct.
On carbon prices
It is not true that Eurelectric study recommends ap-
plying a uniform carbon price to all sectors as the 
only means driving decarbonisation. The modeling 
of the scenarios has used uniform carbon prices ap-
plying on all sectors and countries (as cost-efficiency 
would suggest), but its interpretation from a policy 
perspective is not that carbon prices (taxes or ETS 
type of pricing) should be introduced to non ETS 
sectors. The carbon price for the non ETS is just a 
shadow price inciting decarbonisation without being 
a tax or auction payment (no direct income reducing 
effect). Exactly the same approach was taken in the 
DG CLIMA Roadmap 2050.
The shadow price of carbon (applicable to non ETS) 
is a proxy of the marginal cost of a great variety of 
bottom-up measures (not identified explicitly a pri-
ori, but only their effects on consumption as resulted 
from the model simulations) that would be employed 
for decarbonisation purposes in the non ETS sectors. 
For example a shadow carbon price would incite en-
ergy efficiency but in reality this would be the result 
of specific energy efficiency measures. Similarly, the 
carbon shadow price would motivate electro-mobili-
ty but this would be in reality the result of for example 
strict CO2 car regulation measures. Also, it is not true 
that the carbon pricing is proposed by Eurelectric as 
the only driver. It will be the ultimate driver on top 
of a large series of bottom up measures in all sectors.
Anyway it would be important to expand on the role 
of carbon prices as an instrument beyond EU ETS (or 
expand EU ETS to other sectors). Carbon taxes are an 
option? This will be a major EU role which fits in the 
category about an EU-wide instrument, which is not 
sufficiently expanded in the report.
Transport sector
A major omission of the report is about decarbonisa-
tion in the transport sector and especially the elec-
trification in road transportation and the extensive 
use of biofuels. Transport is a very inflexible sector 
from a decarbonisation perspective, if the structure 
and fuel mix was to remain similar to present situa-
tion. Change of fuel-technology paradigm is neces-
sary (all studies show this). Zero emissions in power 
generation allows for such a change in paradigm, but 
this is not enough, and important transportation sec-
tors can only have recourse to biofuels to decarbonise 
(aviation, maritime, trucks). There are differences in 
the studies about the biofuels (e.g. high biofuels in 
German studies, much lower in others). 
Electrification in road transportation (at a massive 
scale) is a challenge for EU policies and a great oppor-
tunity for car manufacturing. The EU should ensure 
common and harmonized development of recharg-
ing infrastructure in a timely manner, and common 
standards for the entire chain. Smart metering and 
common market rules should ensure charging at base-
load hours and keeping a level playing field regarding 
competition in the new market segment. Many other 
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common transport policies should be identified, as 
for example for rail freight, etc. (see Whiter paper on 
transports just released by DG MOVE).
Renewables
Harmonizing the RES supporting policies is not suf-
ficiently expanded in the report. Abandoning current 
system of subsidies is discussed everywhere in Eu-
rope, but the replacement of this system is not identi-
fied and in any case it should be harmonized at EU 
wide level and compatible with market competition 
especially in future conditions with stochastic RES 
contributing by more than 40% in power generation. 
This is a great EU role to play. 
Also for RES, the least common denominator of all 
studies is the importance of RES facilitation policies: 
grids, interconnections, building codes and other 
measures (incl. smart grids) for high development of 
very small scale RES, back-up, storage, common bal-
ancing, licensing and easiness of access to new sites 
(incl. remote offshore areas). EU contribution should 
be identified and mentioned for this policy area.
Affordability
The EU can play a role in addressing adverse effects 
of decarbonisation costs (and higher requirements 
for investment) regarding poverty and affordability, 
by shaping harmonized rules for more extended pub-
lic service obligations (beyond electricity). This topic 
should be also mentioned.
Gas market
Area to be mentioned with emphasis on great EU role 
as gas will have a strategic contribution and a key role 
in balancing: common EU market, flexibility, security 
of supply, affordability for small players, etc.
Project Advisor: Christian von HIRSCHHAUSEN, 
Professor at TU Berlin, DIW Berlin 
Submission date: June 2011
As one of the scientific advisors to Think on the report 
„Transition towards a low carbon energy system by 
2050: what role for the EU“ I have participated both 
in the experts meeting and in the Scientific Commit-
tee. In the following I summarize the issues raised live 
at these meetings
The objective of the report is “to structure the debate 
on the role of the EU to guide the transition towards 
a low-carbon energy system by 2050, based on vi-
sions presented by different stakeholders and existing 
Member States’ strategies to achieve the transition” 
(p. 1). The report consists of two parts:
- Descriptive “tale” of stakeholder/Member States’ ap-
proach to 2050
- Discussion about “possible role of the EU” (“y pens-
er toujours, en parler jamais”)
The latter is later highlighted in 5 fields of action. In 
general, one senses a very significant competence on 
two of the “really important” issues: 4/ infrastructure, 
and 5/ energy market, whereas the others are dealt 
with in more general terms. The paper also derives 
some suggestions and recommendations have been 
given by the stakeholders, but it is less clear what 
could or should be the role of the EU.
My basic point is that the objective of 2050, i.e. a 80-
95% reduction of CO2 with respect to 1990, should 
guide the question “what needs to be done (at Euro-
pean level) to attain this goal IN EACH SECTOR”. We 
are mostly energy/electricity people, but this question 
can not be answered without looking at the transpor-
tation sector, and the industrial sector (off course the 
household sector as well). Consequently, we should 
organize a competence in these sectors, if we want to 
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be compatible with the 3 2050 roadmaps that are up-
coming (ENER, MOVE, CLIM).
I think by just comparing studies that tackle the issue 
from today’s perspective, with a focus on the energy/
electricity sector, we are missing important issues, 
and my two favorites are:
a) Decarbonizing the transportation sector, with a 
particular focus on biofuels (I would love to believe in 
the scenarios on electromobility, but it is one scenario 
amongst many, and not a very realistic one); here I 
think a serious discussion of BIOFUELS, in connec-
tion with BIOMASS in general, is crucial. We have so 
far avoided detailed analysis of the sector, but need to 
engage into it.
b) The industry sector is a major CO2 emitter, both 
from energy uses, and process heat uses; the latter are 
sometimes not avoidable, as in metal/steel, cement/
klinker, ammoniak, hydrogen, petrochemicals, etc. 
Unless processes that are “cleaner” are found, there 
is no way to maintain these sectors in the European 
industrial landscape, and meet the targets.
I would therefore have liked to see an in-depth treat-
ment of these issues, and a focus of one (or two?) re-
searchers in these fields that we are usually not very 
interested in… With respect to energy efficiency, the 
report may have included an analytical discussion 
what the “market failure” is all about, and how it can 
be remedied. Also, I have the impression that energy 
efficiency policies need to be different, and to a cer-
tain degree decentralized, e.g. to distinguish policies 
in Spain vs. Estonia.
Section 3.3: suggests to treat CCTS (carbon capture, 
transportation, and storage) as a “bridging technol-
ogy”. I think this is unrealistic in the European energy 
sector. In particular I do not see any reason to treat 
CCTS as a substitute for renewables. No other tech-
nology has received such focused support, and not 
yet delivered; one also observes that the focus is mov-
ing form electricity to industrial applications (steel, 
cement).
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Annex 7: Conclusions of the public con-
sultation based on a preliminary version 
of the report April - May46
Responsible: Serge GALANT, Technofi 
Submission date: June 2011
Giving sense to the “EU involvement” concept
The report should address very early the definition of 
the concept of “EU involvement”. Indeed, there might 
be confusion about the meaning of “EU”. Is it 
– The Council with specific political initiatives ap-
proved at the majority of the Member States?
– The Parliament with specific measures?
– The European Commission with dedicated RD&D 
activities?
– All three like in the building of Directives? 
It is proposed to recall the European Added Value of 
measures in the energy sector which were decided in 
the past to give a precise sense to what is understood 
as “EU involvement” in this report.
Fighting against further national policy frag-
mentation 
The report identifies a major fear in setting and reach-
ing 2050 targets: the fragmentation of policy meas-
ures that make this goal unrealistic. 
The report proposal
The present report rightly addresses the issue of na-
tional policy fragmentation to cope with climate 
change challenges. It proposes routes in section 3.2 
which raises even more issues than it could help solv-
ing as mentioned in the EWEA comments for elec-
tricity generation capacity mechanisms. A European 
46  With written comments either in the initial drat report 
or in a specific paper coming from Greenovate !Europe, GERG, 
EWEA. ENTSO-E was not in a position under such a short notice 
to propose an answer.
capacity payment mechanism has distortive effects. 
National experiences already show that design and 
implementation of such capacity payments is com-
plex and may lead to investment distortions as it dis 
incentivizes demand-side participation as well as 
investments in interconnections and storage capac-
ity. As a matter of fact, capacity payments might be 
considered as a temporary regulatory tool to relieve 
occasional tightness in generation adequacy and en-
sure security of supply in weakly interconnected or 
isolated power systems. Yet, in an interconnected 
system like continental Europe, capacity payments 
should follow the foreseen improvements in current 
electricity markets, i.e. implementing European-wide 
market coupling by 2014 as targeted by the European 
Commission, establishing and integrating intra-day 
markets, enhancing market-based demand-side par-
ticipation, increased transmission capacity, etc. 
Recommendations
The report should keep away from specifying dedicat-
ed measures to fight policy fragmentation but rather 
propose routes for policy improvements in view of 
meeting 2050 decarbonization goals (see below the 
interdependence theme).
Future levels of EU involvement: avoid being 
technology prescriptive 
There are two generic mistakes in this document 
which may lead to very strange conclusions in con-
nection with CCS. 
– CCS is not an energy source: it is an end-of-pipe 
technology. There is nothing in the renewables legis-
lation that impacts the possible development of CCS.
– “Renewable energy technology” is not one single 
technology: it means 10 to 15 different technologies 
with no “dominant technology”, although wind and 
biomass are expected to make the largest contribu-
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tions up to 2020, just as they did between 2000 and 
2010. The EU policy approach has, so far, encouraged 
competition between all these renewable energy tech-
nologies which means that the lowest cost options - 
wind and biomass - will be the largest contributors to 
the targets. 
Hence, the argument made in the report for CCS 
could just as easily be made for the majority of re-
newable energy sources, e.g. geothermal, tidal, wave, 
offshore wind energy, CSP etc. These are all being 
deployed due to national efforts, the Directive being 
technology neutral. 
As a matter of fact, a technology-prescriptive effort 
at EU level for CCS would require addressing all 
the other - currently less competitive - technologies, 
which are not assisted under current EU renewables 
legislation. 
Towards a fourth level of EU involvement: 
stressing the needs for more interdependence 
to reach the 2050 goals
One way of fighting the increased fragmentation 
of national energy policy is to give the EC a role in 
showing the impacts of more interdependence at re-
gional, national and European level. A fourth level 
of involvement should be created in order to design 
public incentives that would correct for future frag-
mentation by encouraging for positive interdepend-
ence. Increasing interdependence between organiza-
tions has indeed both pros and cons:
– maximizing interdependence will lead to extra 
investment costs (for instance in networks intercon-
necting organizations) which can be recovered either 
by savings on the energy needs to run a business and/
or by getting revenues from carbon credits, a tool 
which will be deployed at European level to drive a 
low carbon economy
– maximizing interdependence may lead to a lack 
of system reliability beyond a certain critical level: 
if one critical energy provider experiences an inter-
nal failure (for instance, lack of waste heat towards 
downstream end users due to a breakdown of its own 
industrial process), many other players may also face 
a loss of reliability which also could impact their busi-
ness activities.
There are technical, legal, regulatory, social and eco-
nomic challenges at promoting interdependence 
between energy players in Europe at all levels. It is 
believed that interdependence will become a generic 
driving factor to decarbonize our energy system in 
Europe. The involvement of EU players (Council, 
European Commission and Parliament) will be nec-
essary to promote optimal levels of interdependence 
as a mean to reinforce the credibility of the upcom-
ing 2050 decarbonization goals. The recent decision 
of the German Government to phase out of nuclear 
electricity production illustrates the role of interde-
pendence in future EU 27 energy policies. 
The natural gas energy vector
There is a major flaw in the work: the natural gas is-
sue, with related comments on the hydrogen econo-
my, should be included in the report. Natural gas will 
be very critical in a post Fukushima assessment of 
the 2050 decarbonization goals, The involvement of 
EU27 will go much beyond the Third Energy package 
where gas and electricity networks were at stake. 
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